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Aircraft passenger safety briefing cards are an important part of

passenger safety education aboard commercial aircraft. The cards must be
understood by all readers, regardless of age, gender, or culture. Related
research indicates that passengers from different cultures might
misunderstand the highly specialized instructions on safety cards.
A self-developed test was administered to 172 students from four
cultures (British, French, German, U.S.) at seven universities in five
countries. Significant differences (p<0.05) according to culture were found for
the interpretation of pictograms. Culture did also significantly influence the
understanding of the color designating emergency exits in airplane floor
lighting (p<0.01). European subjects selected green, while subjects from the
U.S. chose red. Although significant differences were found in the design
preferences for safety cards, these differences were not as hypothesized.
The results indicate that the interpretation of safety information varies
between cultures. Appropriate recommendations were made.
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Introduction
The Accident Record
Travel aboard commercial airliners has become the safest mode of
transportation. Fatal injuries per passenger mile are 12 times less likely to
occur during commercial air travel than when travelling by automobile. In
the United States alone, some 50,000 people die each year in car-related
accidents (Goldstein, 1990). Approximately 1,000 people are killed in various
forms of air transportation in one year in the U.S., most of them (> 95%) in
general aviation. The number of people killed in commercial aviation
accidents worldwide varies between approximately 300 and 2,000 per year
(Taylor, 1989). Large fatal accidents are rare in commercial air transportation.
Thus, a single accident with many fatalities can significantly increase the
number of people killed in a particular year.
To reduce the possibility of aircraft accidents even further, aircraft must
pass a series of tests to ensure that their airframes, engines, and equipment
are suitable for the aircraft's operations before being certified. Likewise,
aviation personnel are trained and licensed in accordance with stringent rules
and regulations. Procedures must be followed in every aspect of aviation to
ensure safe and efficient air transportation. The focus in aviation, more than
in any other mode of travel, is on safety. Yet, even the most sophisticated
aircraft flown by the most experienced pilots have been involved in accidents,
some of which were disastrous.

Survival of Aircraft Accidents
Although it is a common misconception within the public, most
accidents of large jet airplanes and smaller commuter aircraft used by major
1
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and regional airlines are survivable.

In fact, in less than 14% of commercial

aircraft accidents in the United States, somebody died (fatal accidents). The
public perception was, however, that in 75% of airline accidents somebody
aboard was killed (Barthelmes, 1985). According to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a non-survivable accident is one during
which (a) the fuselage of the aircraft is substantially damaged, or (b) the
impact forces exceed human tolerances, or (c) the seatbelts and seat-restraint
systems do not properly secure the passengers. Still, during accidents that
were categorized as non-survivable, passengers did survive.
If the majority of aircraft accidents are survivable and non-fatal, this
means that passengers aboard an aircraft in most cases should be able to
escape from an accident without fatal injuries or even without being
physically harmed at all. Yet, many aircraft occupants who did survive the
initial phases of an otherwise survivable accident unharmed were killed or
severely injured by other subsequent factors. Passengers who were trapped
inside an aircraft were killed by smoke inhalation, fire, or thermal exposure
(Johnson, 1984). Thus, the means to successfully escape from an aircraft
accident must be provided to the passengers. Emergency exits, exit slides, and
life vests are only some of the required equipment installed in large
commercial aircraft towards the goal of allowing aircraft occupants to survive
after an initial accident.

Passenger Safety Education
No matter how sophisticated the equipment is, for it to be useful,
passengers also must be able to use the provided hardware effectively. Yet,
aircraft accident history shows that passengers exposed to emergency
situations often were not able to perform the necessary survival tasks
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correctly, e.g., donning life vests or oxygen masks, or opening emergency
exits. Barthelmes (1985) cited one example in which only two of 53 passengers
aboard a large commercial jet aircraft were able to don their oxygen mask
correctly after a cabin depressurization occured. It has, however, also been
shown that passengers who were well-informed of emergency procedures and
the use of emergency equipment were more likely to react in a correct and
timely manner during an accident than uninformed aircraft occupants (e.g.,
Johnson, 1984). These findings can be explained by fundamental
psychological principles which state that human behavior during
emergencies is directed by two different methodologies (Johnson, 1980):
1. If people have learned how to answer an emergency beforehand,
their response to that particular situation is less directed by conscious
thinking than if the situation is new. Previously learned and practiced
procedures are followed, leading to faster response times and lower error rates
(Stewart-Morris, 1991).
2. If, however, the situation faced is unprecedented, people must
develop a new set of rules to follow. This process can be very time
consuming, and it implies the possibility of serious errors, especially under
considerable stress such as in a life-threatening situation.
For the aforementioned reasons, passenger education regarding
emergency procedures and the use of emergency equipment has become a
vital part of safety precautions in commercial air transportation. In addition
to oral briefings by crewmembers (i.e., flight attendants), video presentations,
and placards, airlines are required by law (see Appendices A and B) to provide
printed material to inform passengers of emergency procedures (Department
of Transportation [DoT], 1992). This information is generally displayed on
passenger safety information briefing cards which can usually be found in the

seat pocket in front of the passenger. The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs) require these cards to be applicable only to the respective aircraft, and
to show the location and operation of emergency exits and other related
equipment (DoT, 1992).

Advantages of Passenger Briefing Cards
Unlike video presentations or crewmember briefings, the safety
briefing cards are the only source of information available to the passenger at
any time throughout the whole flight. Flight attendants are often occupied
with other tasks, and video presentations usually are shown only once or,
seldom, twice during a flight.
Most accidents occur during three critical phases of flight: during takeoff and initial climb (23.5%), approach to land (45%), and landing (8%)
(Lufthansa Jahrbuch, 1987). These statistics suggest that more than half of all
aircraft accidents (53%) happen considerably after crewmember briefings or
video presentations have been given. Long trans- and intercontinental
nonstop flights frequently last up to 12 hours. In these cases, the time
between the initial presentation of safety information and the point when
this information needs to be recalled by a passenger during an approach or
landing accident can be so long that many passengers might not be able to
remember such information. This problem is aggravated by the fact that most
aircraft passengers have no previous "hands-on" experience with the
emergency equipment and procedures, whereas each crewmember of U.S.
scheduled air carriers, for example, must perform the actual operation of
emergency equipment at least once every 24 calender months (DoT, 1992). If a
passenger decided to review the safety information, the only source accessible
at any moment would be the safety card. The cards, therefore, must be as
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effective as possible, i.e., convey to the passengers in the fastest and least
misunderstandable way the information of how to perform the necessary
tasks.

Understanding of Safety Cards
Current safety cards employ a variety of graphics technologies to
transmit safety information to passengers. In addition to worded
information, sometimes translated into several languages, pictorial display
formats are used, such as photographs, drawings, or pictograms. According to
the Dictionary of Psychology (Reber, 1985), a pictogram is "a picture or symbol
used to represent an object or a concept" (p. 548). Thus, pictograms differ
from realistic drawings in being substantially simplified (e.g., they omit all
supplemental graphic information unnecessary to represent the object or
concept). Pictograms, as well as photographs and languages, are only
meaningful if the reader "recognizes a previously seen shape or has learned
the signification of a conventional shape" (Bertin, 1983, p. 51). This
symbolism involved in understanding the depicted safety information
requires a certain amount of common previous experiences and knowledge
among the passengers (e.g., in the recognition of pictograms).
A common core of experiences among aircraft occupants is difficult to
assume, since today's air travel is truly international. In 1989, more than 1.1
billion passengers traveled on scheduled air carriers worldwide (Lufthansa
Jahrbuch, 1990). Passengers come from many different countries even on
domestic flights. The languages and cultural backgrounds of aircraft
occupants are often extremely diversified. Yet, all passengers must be
addressed when presenting safety information. Since safety briefing cards
play an important role in passenger safety education, they must be
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understood by every reader, regardless of age, previous experience, native
language, or culture. The Dictionary of Psychology (Reber, 1985) defines the
term "culture" as:
The system of information that codes the manner in which the people
in an organized group, society or nation interact with their social and
physical environment. In this sense the term is really used so that the
frame of reference is the set of rules, regulations, mores and methods
of interaction within the group. . . . each member must learn the
systems and the structures (p. 170).
The graphics technologies employed on aircraft passenger safety cards
require recognition of abstract information based on previous experiences or a
previous frame of reference. Thus, questions arise whether interpretation
and understanding of safety briefing cards are influenced by varying cultural
backgrounds. Do two aircraft passengers from different countries who each
speak a different language comprehend instructions in two separate ways
because of their culture? If so, are the differences so great that they might
constitute a danger to safety? Which symbols are universally recognized, and
which are misunderstandable? Do people from various countries have
different preferences of how information should be presented?

Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study was to investigate how the information on
passenger safety briefing cards is understood and interpreted by subjects from
different cultural and geographical backgrounds. Several features of current
aircraft safety cards were tested for their overall effectiveness among
university students from Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The probable outcome of the subjects' answers in a
real emergency was compared to their previous aviation experiences, their
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gender, and their cultural background to determine whether culture has a
significant influence on the understanding of briefing cards.
This study could serve as a basis for further investigation into crosscultural aspects of passenger safety education. Areas to be studied could
include differences in attention to safety presentations, or possible benefits of
individualized video presentations in multiple languages.

Review of the Related Literature
Benefits of Passenger Safety Briefing Cards
There is a need to convey safety information to all occupants of
commercial aircraft. The NTSB stated in 1974 that the percentage of
passengers injured during mishaps who had not read the passenger safety
briefing card was three times as great as that for those who had read the card
(Altman, 1975a). Johnson (1972) found that inaction or wrong reaction after
aircraft accidents were considerably lower among passengers who had
received specific and understandable safety information. Additionally,
passengers who were informed of the emergency exits and evacuation
procedures were able to act according to a plan, leading to higher probabilities
of survival after an aircraft accident. Pre-planning and quick action were
important factors common to those passengers who survived major aircraft
accidents, such as the runway collision at Tenerife in 1977 or the post-landing
fire of a twin-jet in Cincinnati, Ohio, on June 2, 1983 (Barthelmes, 1985). In
fact, Johnson (1984) cited several examples of passengers who attributed their
survival solely to the fact that they had followed the pre-departure briefing
and read the safety card.
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Previous Studies of Safety Card Designs
Previous investigations into the effectiveness of aircraft passenger
briefing cards focused exclusively on subjects from a single country, although
the problem of educating passengers from different cultures had been
recognized (Altman, 1974a; Edwards, 1990). The effectiveness of passenger
safety briefing cards can be measured using different approaches. Johnson
(1985), whose Interaction Research Corporation (IRC™) has been designing
about 50% of the safety cards aboard U.S. airliners (Brooks, 1986), has
conducted regular studies regarding the effectiveness of briefing card designs.
At IRC, safety cards were redesigned until a 90% level of understanding was
achieved by subjects who were not continuously involved in air
transportation (Lundstrom, 1988). Two basic methods for the test of safety
card designs have been employed:
1. Behavioral tests investigate a subject's ability to perform a specific
task after receiving safety information, e.g., donning oxygen masks after
reading the respective part on a passenger safety briefing card. Although these
tests carry a high validity, since they actually require a subject to perform the
safety-related task, behavioral tests necessitate complex and somewhat timeconsuming testing procedures. Only a limited sample of the population can
be tested, and the tests are mostly restricted to a single task,
2. Conceptual tests are the more often used approach: Various designs
and certain features of safety cards are shown by trained interviewers to testparticipants who then attempt to interpret and verbally describe the depicted
information. While conceptual tests do not require the subjects to physically
execute the tasks depicted on the cards, they allow a substantially higher
number of subjects to be tested over a greater variety of tasks.
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Altman (1974b) used the behavioral approach to investigate the
effectiveness of safety card designs on life jacket donning. The study was
limited to U.S. subjects and revealed procedural problems with regard to the
depiction of the various steps in life jacket donning. The findings were
supported by Johnson, Blom, and Altman (1975) who investigated the
effectiveness of video presentations on the same task of life jacket donning
using the conceptual test method. It was concluded that nonverbal
presentation of safety information yields considerable benefits over worded
instructions when properly tested. In this study, age had no significant
influence on the answers, while gender and previous flight experience did
influence the amount of correct interpretations: Men did interpret the
presented pictures more correct than women, and more experienced
passengers also had an increased knowledge of safety procedures.
Johnson and Altman (1973) studied the influence of various safety card
designs on passenger behavior when using emergency escape slides. The
correct procedure of leaving an airplane via an emergency slide is to jump
onto the slide instead of sitting down at the door and then sliding down the
chute. Subjects received different instructions: With no briefing card, 59.9%
of the subjects jumped onto the slide; with a briefing card instructing the
passengers to jump, 67.8% did in fact jump, while the highest jump ratio
(73.5%) was achieved when subjects received a briefing card telling the
passengers to "jump don't sit" (p. 215). In a separate analysis of the data, no
significant differences due to the subjects' gender were found.
Finnair, the state airline of Finland, conducted a conceptual test of a
safety card before introducing the McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 into their fleet
(Paajanen, 1991). To simulate naive subjects, 112 Finnish schoolchildren
between the ages of 11 and 12 years were asked in open-ended questions to

answer in writing what they thought was meant by each presented part of the
safety card. The design exclusively used drawings and pictograms. The
results of the study supported earlier findings regarding the design of safety
cards, such as the fact that the introduction of perspectively correct drawings
can be clarifying (Altman, Johnson, & Blom, 1970). Another outcome of the
study was the finding that pictorial representations without any explanatory
words could be misleading. Many children mistook the drawing of a
uniformed flight attendant opening one exit, while a non-uniformed person
opened a different exit, for a separation of doors available to passengers and
crewmembers. Thus, if confronted with an emergency evacuation, these
children would probably not use the exit depicted with the uniformed
crewmember. This could lead to serious blockages, delays, and even the loss
of lives.
In 1987, Schmidt and Kysor published the results of two studies which
they conducted to investigate the appeal and effectiveness of safety briefing
cards on U.S. students and government employees. The subjects, 10 human
factors professionals and 15 regular commercial airline passengers were asked
to rank 33 sample briefing cards in the order of their perceived effectiveness.
While the highest-ranked cards used more pictures, more colors, and were
comparably larger, they also used a minimum amount of words integrated
with pictures. In addition to the first test, 25 government employees were
given one card each and received an oral briefing. After the briefing was
completed, the subjects had to answer specific questions regarding safety
procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of the cards. Schmidt and Kysor
concluded that those briefing cards which used sketches and drawings instead
of photographs and that followed general recommendations were more
effective than those which did not have these features. These results
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corroborated with other research regarding aircraft passenger safety cards (e.g.,
Altman, Johnson, & Blom, 1970; Johnson 1984, 1985). Johnson (1980)
recommended a detailed, pictorial, and four-colored card without photos. A
photograph is less effective than a well-designed drawing, because the photo
also shows unnecessary details, creating clutter and "visual noise"
(Lundstrom, 1988, p. 39; Dwyer, 1967). Additionally, the cards should be
independent from the reader's language or reading capability by using
pictograms rather than words. Long and complicated sentences should be
avoided and replaced by short instructions in basic English. "Omit reasons
why, concentrate on procedures" (Schmidt & Kysor, 1987, p. 51). Altman,
Johnson, and Blom (1970) preceded Schmidt and Kysor (1987) with a similar
study: Twenty-two then-current passenger safety briefing cards were ranked
in two separate tests by psychology students and human factors specialists
according to their effectiveness. Edwards (1990) summarized the findings
from these tests within the following guidelines for effective card design:
1. Pictures with a minimum of descriptive words alone are more
acceptable than pictures alone, words alone, or pictures with a large
number of descriptive words.
2. A realistic understandable picture of good quality is preferable to an
abstract drawing.
3. Where a sequence of actions is called for, two or more numbered
pictures are desirable.
4. A simple, uncluttered, systematically-organized card format
enhances acceptance by the reader (p. 184).
Although none of the cited studies specifically addressed international
subjects, one result from both behavioral and conceptual tests (e.g., Altman,
Johnson, & Blom, 1970) was the recommendation of culture free methods of
conveying safety information (Altman, 1975b). Basic guidelines for culture
free techniques have been published by the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) and the U.S. Society of Automotive Engineers (NTSB,
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1985). The use of pictorial representations instead of worded instructions has
been encouraged. Johnson, Blom, and Altman (1975) expressed their "hope
that such information displays may be understood by people from all the
major language groups in the world" (p. 107). If words were necessary to
explain a fact or idea, the translation into several languages was
recommended. These recommendations, however, are very limited and
allow a considerable range of alternatives in the design of safety cards.

Current Aircraft Passenger Information Cards
In a 1985 safety study, the NTSB compared 80 different briefing cards
from 13 U.S. airlines. It was concluded that already the U.S. cards varied
significantly not only in form, size, and outer appearance, but also in the
conveyed information. When comparing U.S. safety cards for their tests,
Schmidt and Kysor (1987) distinguished five distinctively different card
design methods, such as "mostly words," "words plus diagrams," "mostly
diagrams," etc. (p. 54). Some authors (e.g., Schmidt & Kysor, 1987) attributed
these differences to factors such as novelty to catch the readers' interest or the
production of safety cards for specific audiences. The NTSB (1985) stated that
a lack of standardization among the cards was also a result of the limited
regulatory guidance with respect to passenger safety briefing cards.
In the U.S., Parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs) govern the design and contents of safety cards (See
Appendices A and B), together with the respective Advisory Circulars (ACs).
The most stringent regulations regarding safety cards are stipulated by FAR
121.571 and the accompanying AC121-24A Passenger safety information and
briefing cards (DoT, 1989). Yet, neither a standard format nor special testing of
the cards are required. Additionally, no provisions have been made to
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address non-English speaking passengers except for the recommendation that
the use of international symbols is encouraged. In fact, after a new regulation
came into effect limiting exit-row seating, some airlines incorporated this
information on their cards by printing it solely in English, including the
statement in the center of the card advising the - potentially illiterate or nonEnglish speaking - readers that they should notify a crewmember and be
reseated if "you do not read English well enough to understand the
instructions on this card or do not understand oral crew commands in
English" (Comair, 1990, p. 1).

Safety Card Sample
To get an overview of currently used aircraft passenger safety briefing
cards, U.S. and international airlines were solicited at various airports in the
U.S. and Europe for current safety card samples. Eighty-two cards from 29
airlines and aircraft manufacturers were collected. Of those 82 cards, 72 were
applicable to large transport category jet aircraft. The other ten cards pertained
to turbopropeller-driven commuter aircraft. Tables 1 and 2 show the origin of
those cards pertaining to jet aircraft according to type, operator, and
geographical area.
The sample taken was not intended to be statistically representative.
Eleven U.S. airlines were contained in the group of jet aircraft operators. The
ten represented European airlines came from France, Germany (3), Iceland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, and the U.K. Three
airlines from Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong were represented among
the Asian operators. Further information about the cards in the sample can
be found in Appendix C.
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Table 1
Safety Cards in the Sample. Number of Cards by Aircraft Type.
Jet Aircraft only

Aircraft Type (Family)

Cards
Total

Airbus A300
Airbus A310
Airbus A320
Boeing B727
Boeing B737
Boeing B747
Boeing B757
Boeing B767
Fokker F100
Lockheed L-1011
McDonnell-Douglas DC-9
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10
McDonnell-Douglas MD-11
McDonnell-Douglas MD-80

4
6
1
14
10
8
2
4
2
4
11
2
2
2

Total Different

72

Between the beginning of acquiring the cards and the preparation of
the final copy of this study, two of the U.S. airlines included in the sample
(Eastern Airlines® and Pan American®) ceased to operate. Two other U.S.
airlines (TWA® and United Airlines®) changed the design of their safety
cards considerably within this time frame, and their new cards were added to
the samples.

Table 2
Safety Cards in the Sample. Number of Operators Represented by Aircraft
Type and by Region, jet Aircraft only

Aircraft Family
and Type

U.S.

Airbus A300
Airbus A310
Airbus A320
Boeing B727
Boeing B737
Boeing B747
Boeing B757
Boeing B767
Fokker F100
Lockheed L-10U
McDonnell-Douglas DC-9
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10
McDonnell-Douglas MD-11
McDonnell-Douglas MD-80

1
2

Total Different

11

8
6
1
1
2
1
2
5
1
1
2

Operators
Europe
1
2
1

Asia

Total

1
1

-

3
5
1
8
10
7
2
2
2
2
5
2
2
2

3

24

-

4
4
1

-

2

1

1
1
10

-

All safety cards contained information about the location and
operation of emergency exits, exit slides, and emergency exit lighting, as well
as instructions regarding the use of supplemental oxygen and floatation
devices (i.e., life vests or floatation cushions). The cards were sorted by the
researcher according to their primary means of communicating safety
information following the categorization proposed by Schmidt and Kysor
(1985):

16
1. No cards used mostly words.
2. Words plus diagrams (i.e., drawings and pictograms) were the
primary means of conveying information on 10 cards. All cards in
this category came from a single U.S. operator (Delta Air Lines®).
3. Twelve cards used words integrated with diagrams. In contrast to
the technique employed for the cards in category 2, these cards had
descriptive texts directly incorporated into the drawings, not as a
separate entry.
4. Mostly diagrams were found on 32 cards.
5. Instead of using diagrams, 18 cards used photos, sometimes photos
combined with text. The cards from the sample that fell into this
category originated from four U.S. air carriers (American®,
Eastern®, Northwest®, and United®) and one European airline
(Swissair®).
Sixty-eight cards in the sample used color to convey safety information
(i.e., the use of color was not restricted to the frame on the card or the airline's
logo), while four cards (all from Northwest Airlines®) were monochrome.
Multiple languages were found on 48 cards from 16 airlines. Only 12 airlines,
however, used different languages to transmit safety information. In all
other cases, the designation of the card was the only part translated into
different languages.
As indicated earlier, several airlines changed the design of their cards
during the collection of the sample. However, no clear trend could be
determined: While one U.S. airline (United®) did change their design from
photos to diagrams integrated with words, another U.S. airline (TWA®)
changed it from mostly diagrams to photos. Lufthansa® German Airlines
incorporated words into their previous design which had used diagrams only.
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Further analysis of the cards revealed distinct differences in certain
areas: Thirty-eight cards from 17 airlines were pertaining to over-wing exits
with removable exit doors and offered an option of where to put the door
once it was removed from the frame during an emergency evacuation. Of
these 38 cards,
1. Eight cards from three airlines proposed to put the door on the seats
in the exit row.
2. Eight cards from nine airlines favored to throw the door outside
through the exit.
3. Nineteen cards from seven airlines advised the passengers to put
the exit door on the seats behind the exit row.
4. Two cards from two airlines showed the door in the row in front of
the exit row.
5. On one card, the exit door was placed on a seat row adjacent to the
exit row.
Other significant differences were found between the instructions of
whether to wear shoes during an emergency evacuation via the escape slides.
The three German airlines represented in the sample required generally that
shoes should be taken off. Thirty-eight cards from 16 airlines used depictions
of high-heel shoes only. The rest of the cards (22 from five U.S. airlines) did
not specify this area.
The lack of standardization among aircraft passenger briefing cards as
found in the sample is aggravated on the international scale by different
regulations in most countries. In Germany, for example, the guidelines
require safety cards to inform about the location and operation of emergency
exits and life preservers, as well as about the supplemental oxygen system, if it
is installed (Bundesverkehrsministerium, 1987). No specifications,
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however, are made regarding how the "appropriate . . . placards and printed
instructions" ["geeignete Hilfsmittel in der Form von Hinweisschildern und
gedruckten Anweisungen"] (p. 673) should be designed. Due to the actual
differences in card design, the NTSB (1985) proposed additional research in
the area of passenger safety education.

Cross-cultural Communication
While the question of cross-cultural communication of safety
information has found comparably little attention for aircraft, it has been the
focus in other areas of transportation. Airports, for example, make use of an
international signage system for passenger guidance and information (Air
Transport Association of America, Airport Operators Council International,
& American Association of Airport Executives, 1985; Cook & Smith, 1980),
using pictograms to convey information to people from various countries.
Effective communication and the understanding of information
depend upon a common basis between the communicator (i.e., the person
who wants to convey the information) and the receiver (i.e., the person for
whom the information is intended) (Casse, 1981; DoT, 1977). A common basis
can consist of shared experiences, the same language, etc. Such factors can
usually be found among people who grew up and lived within the same
culture (Schneller, 1989). If the sender and the receiver, however, come from
different cultures, the probability of missed or failed communication is
increased. In today's truly international air travel, where every place in the
world can be reached by airplane within 36 hours, potential passengers come
from very diversified cultural backgrounds and speak more than 2,800
languages (Collins, 1982). Thus, the passengers' common basis for successful
communication is minimized.
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The use of signs and pictorial representations to transmit ideas is part
of nonverbal communication, in contrast to verbal communication which
uses words and language. According to Morain (1987), nonverbal
communication can employ body language, object language (e.g., signs,
clothing), or environmental language (lighting, color, architecture). As has
been stated earlier, the interpretation of pictograms and realistic drawings
involves the process of symbolism. Combinations of shapes and /or color
produce a meaningful pictorial representation only, if "one recognizes a
previously seen shape or has learned the signification of a conventional
shape" (Bertin, 1983, p. 51). Bertin concluded that the signification of a shape
is never unmistakable:
Indeed, even the most recognizable shapes can suggest numerous
meanings. A horse's head can just as easily correspond to a race track, a
stable, a stud farm, a riding school, a bridal path, a horse butcher, a glue
factory, a harness factory, a chess game, etc. The cross, "symbol" par
excellence, allows students armed with bad maps to imagine New York
as garnished with cemeteries: The fine black crosses of the cemeteries
and the fine red crosses designating monuments are similar at first
glance!
There is no universal shape signification. The meaning of a
symbol becomes familiar to us only by habit; through the repetition of a
similar situation. A shape can become a symbol only within a
restricted domain, rigorously defined and previously familiar to the
observer (p. 95).
Some symbols have a more universal signification than others. This is
especially true for colors as symbols of natural objects: Throughout the world,
human beings perceive red as a symbol of fire, blue for water, or green for
vegetation. However, if they never experienced a natural phenomenon, such
as ice or snow, people might not be able to interpret a picture of white
mountains. Other color symbolisms, on the other hand, are strictly related to
particular cultures. Death is symbolized by black is western societies, while

the respective color is white in parts of the orient. Exit signs in buildings are
green in most parts of Europe, while they are red in the U.S., etc.
Thus, when using color and /or shapes as a code on symbols, it is
mandatory to select pictorial representations which are constant and
intuitively meaningful to potential readers. The purpose of a symbol is not
fulfilled if its meaning changes easily with small changes in its connotation:
"A shape can become a symbol only within a restricted domain, rigorously
defined and previously familiar to the observer. However, we must
recognize that modern information tends to mix different domains and
hinder such familiarity!" (Bertin, 1983, p. 95) An aircraft floating on water, for
example, can have two completely different meanings: When the symbol is
used on a map, it most likely designates a seaplane landing area, while its
meaning on a safety card is: In case of emergency landing on water.
The two different meanings of the plane on water are a typical case of
what Schneller (1989) defined as "misunderstanding": "The addressee
attributes a certain meaning rooted in his own individual pool of knowledge
to the sender's signal or sign. But this meaning attribution differs, or even
contradicts, the sender's intention when he/she encodes the message"
(p. 467). Non-understanding, on the other hand, entails a lack of any
connotation of a given signal, since the symbol does not exist in the receiver's
knowledge. A misunderstanding can be more serious than nonunderstanding, since the receiver assumes to have correctly understood the
message. Acting accordingly, the receiver might actually contradict the
sender's intention. Parker (1988) noted that "illustrations can cause even
more cultural problems than text. [Readers] . . . see illustrations immediately
and react to them more strongly than to a written mistake buried in a
thousands of words" (p. 1).
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Cross-cultural Studies on Communication
Cultural differences were the focus of a study by the Institute for
Defense Analyses (Sinaiko, Guthrie, & Abbott, 1969) regarding U.S. military
and technical aid for the Republic of Vietnam. From previous studies, the
authors concluded that there were "no inherent limits to the absorption of
technical information and the acquisition of new skills" (p. 1) in any culture.
Except for physical stature, culture was found to be learned, rather than
biologically determined (Reber, 1985). Therefore, cultural differences were
most pronounced in habit patterns, such as allocation of time, reluctance or
wish to assume responsibility, or planning (or lack of it). Learning habits
were found to vary according to cultural factors, e.g., the preference for
learning by rote and imitation in some cultures. Therefore, standards of one
culture for cross-cultural communication would not necessarily be applicable
to another culture.
While cross-cultural differences in the understanding of verbal and
body language have been widely demonstrated (e.g., Hall, 1977; Hall & Hall,
1990; Morain, 1987; Schneller, 1989), investigations into cross-cultural
variances in the perception of pictorial material have been rather sparse.
Miller (1973) reviewed previous research in the topic. Most of the cited
studies were conducted by Europeans in Africa. In congruence with previous
findings, Miller (1973) hypothesized that "cultural differences in responses to
certain types of pictorial representations are reflections of differences in
experiences with the techniques or conventions utilized in such
representations, rather than differences in actual visual experiences in the
three-dimensional world" (p. 136). Some subjects who lacked previous
experience with photographs, for example, did devote the bulk of their
attention on the geometrical contour and the white edges of a photograph

rather than focusing on the depicted object. "Once the individual is able to
grasp the idea that a photograph or picture represents an object, he has
learned to use one set of cues . . . to expect to see an object when presented
with a picture" (Miller, 1973, p. 138). Yet, in another study cited by Miller, the
subjects had more difficulty to recognize local, but unfamiliar animals from
photos than familiar ones.
Mangan (1978) noted that the understanding and interpretation of
pictorial representations was also dependent upon the extent to which a
particular culture used graphics communication. In some traditional Islamic
societies, for example, iconic representation was prohibited. Thus, it was
concluded, it might be beneficially in some cultures not to use pictures at all
to convey information. The perspective used to depict a certain object
changed considerably among cultures, from the pseudo three-dimensional
Western perspective, to a "fold-out" view showing all sides of an object in
one picture, as used by some African and native American cultures. Other
research cited by Mangan indicated that training and previous experiences
allowed people to understand pictorial representations which were
previously unfamiliar to them. An otherwise illiterate navigator from
Micronesia was able to instantaneously understand a complicated U.S.
navigational chart since his reference system (celestial objects) mirrored the
one used for the production of the map. Mangan concluded that "visual
images are far from self-explanatory. Accurate interpretation of such images
involves the learning of conventions . . . " (p. 266). ". . . what one sees in a
picture, will to a large degree depend on whether one's cultural environment
(a) is in possession of pictures and (b) places emphasis on acquiring the ability
to perceive what they depict" (p. 247).
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To illustrate the problems caused by lack of previous experiences,
Oborne (1987) cited Barnard and Marcel (1983) who employed the example of
a penguin used to imply frozen goods. As Oborne pointed out, people who
lacked previous experience with or had never seen a penguin might not be
able to make the inferential connection between the symbol and the object it
symbolized. In another study, Zambian children had more problems to
identify a pig from a picture than Scottish children, while the opposite was
true when the children were presented with a picture of a hippopotamus
(Miller, 1973). Parker (1988) noted cultural sensibilities towards the use of
certain illustrations. Gender and skin color of people, or certain animals
depicted in graphics, were considered to be inappropriate or prejudiced
according to cultural experiences. Thus, it was concluded that in order to
effectively relay a certain message to receivers from different cultures,
pictorial representations should be as unambiguous as possible and draw
from a common core of previous experiences among the readers.

Americans, British, French, and Germans:
General Cultural Differences in Communication Styles
Although sharing a long common history and heritage, general
cultural differences have been observed between the United States and
Western Europe, as well as within Western Europe (e.g., Dreyfuss, 1970;
Green & Pew, 1978; Hall & Hall, 1990; Heard, 1974; Lanier, 1973; Taylor, 1990):
Often Germans seem stiff and pompous to Americans while
Americans seem sloppy and superficial to Germans. The French think
Americans are enthusiastic but lacking in style; Americans feel the
French take forever to get down to business. Germans think the
French are not serious enough; the French think the Germans lack
sophistication.
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In fact, each country simply has its own way of seeing and doing
things, based on unstated rules, and these hidden differences often
make cooperation difficult. (Hall & Hall, 1990, p. xiii)
Hall (1977) introduced the concept of high- and low-context cultures.
In a high-context culture, much of the communication is rooted in longstanding traditions and takes place through unspoken hints, such as gestures.
Thus, communication does not require a large amount of additional
background data. Conversely, people from a low-context culture need as
many additional information as possible to communicate. In a low-context
culture, information is compartmentalized and not flowing freely from one
person to another. Thus, the low-context person is accustomed to be
provided with a large amount of background knowledge, from which the
necessary information is derived: "High-context people are . . . apt to become
impatient and irritated when low-context people insist on giving them
information they don't need. Conversely, low-context people are at a loss
when high-context people do not provide enough information (Hall & Hall,
1990, p. 9).
While the French are considered to be people of high context, Germans
are supposedly the exact opposite (Hall & Hall, 1990); Americans and the
British are considered to be between the two extremes, even if more towards
the low-context side. Therefore, Germans want detailed information and
need a highly-defined context when communicating. Communication must
be well-defined, and Germans tend to take longer to convey a particular
message than their French counterparts. This can be documented by the
language and sentence structure in German: Words in German are generally
more exact in meaning than for example in English (Hall & Hall, 1990).
German writers always took pride in a long-sentenced and complicated style
(e.g., Emmanuel Kant). Short sentences are regarded as simplistic in

Germany and as a sign of lacking writing capability. Each German noun has
one of three different genders, and the articles and adjectives must conform.
Germans must include extra accuracy in their verbal communication to
satisfy the need for special information.
The French, on the other hand, do convey a large amount of
information through non-verbal communication, such as body language
(Taylor, 1990). Therefore, a personal appointment is much more appreciated
in France than a telephone conversation or an impersonal letter (Hall & Hall,
1990). With the need for immediate human contacts comes an emphasis of
style and form. The French are very focused on the correct and sophisticated
use of their language, and are very articulate (Lanier, 1973).
Hall and Hall (1990) documented the variances in contexting by the
form and contents of advertisements in France, Germany, and the U.S.:
German ads are loaded with detailed information; products are
described and analyzed. . . . Ads are examined and picked apart . . .
Good advertising strategies in Germany take into account that
Germans are both print-oriented and very literal-minded. . . . print ads
convey information rather than evoke a mood or appeal to sublimal
emotions and desires. . . . The constant changes, the lack of continuity,
the hyperbole and flamboyance [in U.S. advertising] - all puzzle and
annoy [Germans] (p. 71 ff).
Germans ads, however, are often perceived as dull and boring - even by
Germans themselves. Hall and Hall continued:
While the function of German advertising is to transmit
information, the function of a French ad is to release responses - two
entirely different functions. French advertising is high-context. It is
based on product name recognition. . .. French ads are designed to be
visually attractive and eye-catching. This fits the French visual
orientation to life and reflects their sensitivity to aesthetics, color, and
design. . . . An ad that is effective in the U.S. [, however,] will not
necessarily be effective in France (p. 127f).

French advertisement does regularly win international prizes for artistic style
and ingenuity, and samplers of French television ads are popular in German
movie theaters for being entertaining - not for their marketing message.
U.S. advertisement is in marked contrast to the German idea of
detailed information and the French preference for feelings.
Although ads in the United States may contain information, it is
seldom detailed and is usually a bolster for the claims of product
superiority. Exaggerated claims that a product is the best, newest, most
fashionable, or finest are effective in the U.S. but would be both
offensive and illegal in West Germany and would win no awards in
France (Hall & Hall, 1990, p. 169).
As mentioned before, the British way of marketing communication is
between the extremes. British advertisement can be extremely informative,
yet it also can be of outrageous British black humor. Additionally, since U.S.
advertisements do not need to be translated for the United Kingdom, the
British are also exposed to a large amount of U.S. advertisement.

Americans, British, French, and Germans:
Differences in the Use of Technical Signs
As has been shown, one can distinguish between three distinct
communication styles for France, Germany, and the U.S. Great Britain, yet
distinct and deeply rooted in its own history, combines certain parts of the
three styles, making it a well-defined reference point. Communication of
marketing information varied considerably depending on culture. Germans,
for example, preferred a wealth of printed information, while French readers
chose advertisements which were focused more on graphics design.
The reviewed literature did not indicate that the influence of the three
aforementioned communication styles on the interpretation and
understanding of aircraft passenger safety cards has previously been
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investigated. Considerable cross-cultural differences regarding the
understanding of automotive symbols, however, have been found during
tests in the U.S. and Western Europe (e.g., Dreyfuss, 1970; Green and Pew,
1978; Heard, 1974). Automobile transportation is comparable to air travel in
several respects. Cars and aircraft were developed approximately at the same
time. Both modes of transportation have given sets of technical and legal
rules which are comparable in most countries in the world. Yet, the studies
indicated distinct differences between British, French, German, and U.S.
subjects regarding the use of highway and automotive signs. It was concluded
from the tests that the interpretation of automotive symbols in Europe and in
the U.S. varied considerably according to cultural traditions and local
automotive standards set during the first 40 years of automobile
development.
Collins (1982) summarized previous research in the use of symbols for
highway signs, automotive and machinery applications, hazard warnings, as
well as information symbols for buildings. Based upon findings such as that
exit signs in buildings are red in the U.S. while they are green in France and
Germany, the need for standardization and effective testing was emphasized,
especially with regard to the increasing number of international travellers.

Summary
Aircraft passengers who are well-informed of safety procedures and the
use of emergency equipment are more likely to survive an accident
unharmed than uninformed occupants. Passenger safety information
briefing cards are one method of conveying safety information to aircraft
passengers. Current regulations, however, allow substantial differences
between different safety cards. A sample of current safety cards revealed
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distinct differences not only between the cards from different countries, but
also between the cards from a single country.
Safety card designs that are using pictorial displays have been found to
be more effective than those cards using worded instructions. However, even
among cards solely using pictograms, considerable differences can be found.
To understand a picture or symbol, a person needs to have learned the
meaning of the symbol, or must have had previous experiences with the
depicted object or concept. Traditions and cultural backgrounds can lead to
differences in understanding pictorial information by users from different
cultural backgrounds.
Three different communication styles were defined: The high-context
French style conveys a large proportion of information through non-verbal
channels with a preference for visual communication. Germans, being of
very low context and thus on the other end of the spectrum, are very printoriented and need considerable background information to successfully
communicate. Americans, while being more low- than high-context people,
are short and to the point. Although they can get bored by too much
information, they hesitate to make decisions without a sufficient background.
The British, while distinct, share characteristics with all three groups and can
therefore serve as a reference point. Although the influence of these
differences on the interpretation of aircraft passenger safety cards has not been
studied before, previous investigations with regard to the use of symbols in
buildings and cars revealed distinct differences.

Statement of the

Hypotheses

Different cultures may use different symbols for depicting the same
situation, process, or object (Dreyfuss, 1972). It was therefore hypothesized
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that there are significant differences in the understanding and interpretation
of current passenger safety briefing cards among subjects with different
cultural backgrounds. It was also hypothesized that culture will have a
stronger influence than gender, educational background, or previous flight
experience. Based on the three previously defined communication styles,
four detailed hypotheses were developed which state that individual cultural
differences exist in the interpretation of safety cards between subjects from
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. These cultural
differences are more pronounced than the within-group differences such as
gender or previous flight experience. The null-hypotheses for the following
research hypotheses would always be: There is no significant difference
between cultures in this particular respect.
Hypothesis I
Due to their low-context communication style, Germans prefer printed
advertisements with detailed information. French advertisements are more
focused on graphics, since the French are very sensitive towards color and
design. It was hypothesized that, when being asked about their preferences in
designing a safety card, French subjects indicate a higher preference for
graphic stimuli such as drawings and color than German subjects who choose
more worded instructions.
Hypothesis II
Photos were found to be used relatively widely on safety cards from the
U.S. It was hypothesized that, when asked about their preferences on safety
card design features, U.S. subjects indicate a significantly higher preference for
photos than French, German, and British subjects.
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Hypothesis III
Emergency exits are marked red in the United States and green in wide
parts of Europe. It was hypothesized that, when asked about the colors used
to denote aircraft emergency exits, European subjects choose green, while U.S.
subjects choose red over other colors.
Hypothesis IV
The high-context French are strongly oriented towards visual stimuli.
Germans with their low-context culture are supposed to be more susceptible
to worded information. It was hypothesized that, when interpreting complex
pictorial representations, the number of correct answers varies between
subjects according to their culture.

Method
Subjects
One-hundred-and-seventy-two students were employed at seven
universities in five countries. The students came from entire classes selected
by local contacts (i.e., professors and teaching assistants) at the following
universities:
1. Twenty students from the Intitue Don Bosco, Warcoing, Belgium
(Don Bosco).
2. Nineteen students from the Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile,
Toulouse, France (ENAC).
3. Fifty students from Technische Universitat Berlin, Germany
(TU Berlin).
4. Twenty-two students from the University of Hull, United
Kingdom (Hull).
5. Twenty-four students from Cranfield Institute of Technology,
United Kingdom (Cranfield).
6. Twenty-five students from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University,
Daytona Beach, Florida (E-RAU).
7. Twelve students from St. Leo's College, Daytona Beach Center
(St. Leo's).
Since entire classes were selected for the tests, subjects whose native
language differed from that of the country where their respective university
was located were included in the test. These subjects were subsequently
sorted into a special group, and their data were not used in the analysis.

Native Language and Field of Study.
The subjects came from five main groups based upon their native
language with two subgroups each according to their field of study.
Subgroups I (Aero) were complemented by students who studied in an
aviation-related field (i.e., at ENAC, TU Berlin, Cranfield, and E-RAU), while
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subgroups II (Other) consisted of students studying in a non-aviation oriented
field, such as economics (TU Berlin), psychology (St. Leo's and Hull), or
thermal technology and computer science (Don Bosco). The main groups
were:
1. The British group consisted of 27 students who studied in England
and indicated that their native language was English. Nine
students studying air transport management at Cranfield
(subgroup I) and 18 students studying psychology at Hull
(subgroup II) were represented.
2. The French group was augmented by 37 subjects whose native
language was French. Nineteen students were studying air
transportation at ENAC (subgroup I), while 18 students studied
thermal technology or computer science at Don Bosco (subgroup II).
3. All 49 students in the German group studied at TU Berlin and
reported German as their native language. Subgroup I consisted of
twenty-seven students in aeronautical engineering (Luft- und
Raumfahrttechnik), while the 22 students in subgroup II studied
economics (Betriebswirtschaftslehre/Wirtschaftsingenieurwissenschaften).
4. In the U.S. group, 37 U.S. students were represented whose native
language was English. Twenty-five subjects studied in an
aeronautical field at E-RAU, while the 12 subjects from St. Leo's
studied psychology.
5. All students whose native languages were different from those
spoken at the universities where they studied were assigned to the
International group. These students studied at a university outside
the area of their native language (e.g., Africans, Dutch, Germans, or
French at Cranfield). Twenty-two students were sorted into this
group. The data from these subjects were not used in the analysis.
Overall, 150 students complemented the British (27), French (37),
German (49), and U.S. (37) groups. All further data and analyses are limited
to the 150 students in those four groups.
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Age
The students varied according to age. Of the 150 subjects, 20 (or 13.3%)
were 30 years of age or older (one in the U.S. group was over 60), while 130 (or
86.7%) were under 30. Most (10) of the subjects who were 30 years of age or
older came from the U.S. group, subgroup II. Table 3 shows the variations
among the groups according to age.

Table 3
Age Distribution by Group
Group

Subgroup
under 30

British
French
German
U.S.

I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)

Total

6
15
17
17
27
21
25
2
130

Number
over 30
3
3
2
1
0
1
0
10
20

Total
9
18
19
18
27
22
25
12
150

Gender
Overall, 34 female (22.7%) and 116 male (77.3%) subjects from the four
main groups participated in the study. The gender ratio varied considerably
according to the field of study and the native language.
The highest disproportion by gender was noted in the French group,
where 36 of the 37 subjects were male. The genders were most evenly
distributed in the British group. Sixteen (or 59.3%) of the subjects in the
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British group were male, while 11 subjects were female. Table 4 shows the
distribution of genders by group.

Table 4
Gender Distribution by Group
Group

Subgroup

Number
Female

Total

8
8
18
18
25
15
23
1

1
10
1
0
2
7
2
11

9
18
19
18
27
22
25
12

116

34

150

Male
British
French
German
U.S.

Total

I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)

As Table 4 shows, strong variations in the gender distribution could be
observed within all groups according to the field of study. This is a reflection
of the different preferences in field of study among male and female students.
The gender ratio among the subjects who studied aeronautics was highly
skewed towards the male side. Of the 80 subjects in all subgroups I (Aero), 74
(or 92.5%) were male. Six (or 7.5%) female subjects studied Aeronautics. For
the 70 subjects studying in a non-aviation related field (subgroups II), the
genders were more evenly distributed. Forty-two (60%) of the students in
these groups were male, while 28 (or 40%) were female.
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Previous Flight Experience
Subjects were asked about their previous experience as passenger on a
commercial aircraft/airliner. Overall, 135 subjects, or 90%, had flown before,
while 15 subjects, or 10% had not done so.
Of the 15 students that had not flown before, ten (66.7%) did come from
the French group (from subgroup II). One subject from the German group
(subgroup I) and three subjects from the British group (subgroup II) had not
flown before. In the U.S. group, one student from subgroup I had not flown
on a commercial aircraft before.

Table 5
Flight Experience by Group
Group

Subgroup

British
French
German
U.S.

I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)
I (Aero)
II (Other)

Total

Experience
9
15
19
8
26
22
24
12
135

Number
No Experience
0
3
0
10
1
0
1
0
15

Total
9
18
19
18
27
22
25
12
150

All 15 subjects without flight experience were male. The 34 female
students in the four groups all had previously been as a passenger aboard a
commercial aircraft.

Instrument
The reviewed literature did not suggest the existence of standardized
tests to measure the interpretation and understanding of passenger safety
briefing cards among subjects with different cultural backgrounds. Therefore,
the researcher developed and pretested a five-part test/questionnaire for this
study. Native speakers (graduate students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University including the researcher) reviewed and translated the tests from
English into French and German. The tests/questionnaires were sent by mail
to the participating universities and administered there by local contacts.
Copies of the tests can be found in Appendices D, E, and F.

Description
The tests consisted of five parts on seven 8.5in x 11 in U.S. standard
letter pages:
1. In the first part, five questions solicited information about the
subjects' previous air travel experience and their exposure to safety cards.
Subjects had to indicate whether they had previously flown on a commercial
aircraft (yes I no). If they had flown before, they were asked to state how often
they usually flew per year (about once or twice/ several times/about each
month), when they did fly last, (less than a month ago/less than a year
ago/more than a year ago), whether they read the safety card on their last
flight (yes/no), and - if they did not read the card - why (knew its
contents/did

not want to/could not find it).

2. An opinionnaire solicited the subjects' opinions regarding their
preferred safety card design to test Hypotheses I and II. Subjects were asked to
indicate (using the numbers 1, 2, and 3) the three design features which were
most important to them if they had to design a safety card. The seven items

they could choose from were: (a) drawings, (b) photographs, (c) durability of
the card, (d) use of different languages, (e) multi-colored, (f) size of the card,
and (g) words/writing.
3. In an additional questionnaire-part, 13 black-and-white pictograms
of a fixed size (50 mm x 50 mm and 50 mm x 75 mm, respectively) similar to
those on current safety cards were presented to the test participants. The
subjects were asked: "For each of the symbols presented, please describe in a
few words what you think they represent most likely." An example was
included to show the intention of the question.
Three of the 13 pictograms focused on floor-level emergency exit
lighting and color-coding of exits. Three pictograms depicted the requirement
to take off (high-heel) shoes before using emergency exit slides. Two
pictograms showed the correct method of using the exit slides, and two
symbols represented the prohibition of the using electronic equipment aboard
an aircraft. The other three pictograms pertained each to a special area:
(a) supplemental oxygen, (b) in case of ditching, and (c) prohibition of butane
lighters. The intention of this part was to investigate the actual
understanding and interpretation of current safety card pictograms
(Hypothesis IV).
4. The fourth part of the questionnaire/test contained three questions.
In the first question, the subjects were presented with the situation that they
had to open an over-wing emergency exit door. The scenario was presented
in writing and in five line-drawings of the size 63 mm x 63 mm. The subjects
had to select from four illustrated choices where they would leave the door
once removed from the frame: (a) on the seats in front of you, (b) throw it
outside the plane, (c) on the seats in your row, or (d) on the seats in the row
behind you. This question was included in the test as an additional

indication of the general hypothesis that cross-cultural differences existed
among the subjects from the four cultures.
To test the research hypothesis regarding the color of lights to denote
emergency exits (Hypothesis III), a two-part question was introduced in the
test. Since subjects with previous exposure to air travel were thought to
answer the question depending upon their experiences, the question was
posed in two ways:
In the first part (question 5a), the subjects were asked: "Which color
most likely indicates an exit?" The subjects could choose from five options:
(a) white, (b) yellow, (c) red, (d) green, and (e) blue.
In the second part of the question (5b), the subjects were asked: "In
your opinion, which color should be used to mark an exit?" The subjects
again could choose from the same five colors: (a) white, (b) yellow, (c) red,
(d) green, and (e) blue.
5. Biographical data from the subjects were collected using the
questionnaire-form in the last part of the test. These data included the
subjects' gender (female/male), age in broad thirty-year intervals (under 30,30
to 60, over 60), native language, home country, country where studying, and
field of study (major).

Development and Features
The safety test/questionnaire was developed by the researcher at
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. During all phases of the
development, the researcher solicited input and opinions from various
faculty, staff, and students at E-RAU.
In order to develop a data gathering instrument which was valid and
reliable with respect to the understanding of safety cards, a sample of current
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passenger safety briefing cards for jet aircraft was collected. Several U.S. and
international airlines were solicited for safety cards from their fleets. A total
of 82 cards were collected. Seventy-two cards from 24 operators in 12
countries pertained to jet aircraft. The safety cards in the sample were presorted according to their main technique of presenting safety information,
following the categories proposed by Schmidt and Kysor (1987). The
researcher evaluated the cards with respect to special safety areas and possible
ambiguities in their design (see Review of the Related Literature). Selected
features of the cards were the basis for the development of a special safety
test/questionnaire.
Since the reviewed literature suggested a significant influence of
previous flight experience on safety card understanding, the first section of
the test centered on this topic. Broad categories were chosen to minimize
possible confusion and thus unreliable data from the subjects. The goal was
to differentiate between subjects with casual and those with frequent
experience, as well as between subjects with recent and those with past
experience as aircraft passenger. Additionally, data regarding the usage of
safety cards were collected.
The subjects did indicate their three preferences of safety card design
features in an opinionnaire-form question. Seven common design features
were identified from the sample of safety cards. To allow the subjects to
"create" their favorite design, the three most important items were solicited.
In the main part of the test, 13 pictograms similar to those found on
actual safety cards were presented. In open-ended questions, the subjects
described in a few words what they thought the respective pictograms
indicated. For the selection of the 13 pictograms that had to be interpreted,
four main safety areas were identified: (a) Floor-level emergency exit lighting
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and color-coding of exits (three pictograms); (b) the requirement to take off
(high-heel) shoes before using emergency exit slides (three drawings); (c) the
correct method ("jump - don't sit") of using exit slides (two pictograms); and
(d) the operation of electronic equipment on board (two symbols). These four
areas were found to be of special interest, since they either were critical to
survival after an aircraft accident (e.g., the location and operation of safety
exits and slides), or - as in the case of the operation of electronic equipment were not intuitively obvious without special knowledge. As stipulated in
U.S. FAR 91.21(a) (see Appendix G), the operation of any portable electronic
device aboard an air carrier aircraft is prohibited, unless it is allowed through
the special exceptions in FAR 91.21(b). Thus, the pictures were specifically
included to test Hypothesis IV, using a regulation the subjects were most
likely not completely familiar with.
Within the four main areas, the researcher identified two to three
pictograms each from the safety card sample. To add some further indication
about the influence of realism on the general understanding of pictures, the
pictograms were chosen from the safety card sample by their degree of
abstraction: For the removal of (high-heel) shoes, for example, the selected
symbols varied from very naturalistic over somewhat naturalistic to very
abstract (Figure 1). The same general principle was used to select the
pictograms for the emergency exit floor lighting system (Figure 2), the exit
slide usage (Figure 3), and the operation of electronic equipment (Figure 4)
Three pictograms from other areas were considered by the researcher to
be probably ambiguous and thus included in the test. Additionally, these
symbols served the purpose of "hiding" the pictures from the four main areas
within a larger number of symbols.
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HEELS2

HEELS1

HEELS3

Very Abstract

Naturalistic

Very Naturalistic

Figure 1. The Three Pictograms Representing Instructions to Remove HighHeel Shoes (HEELS1, HEELS2, HEELS3).

FLOORLIG

SMOKELIG

EXITl

Abstract

Naturalistic

Very Naturalistic

Figure 2. The Three Pictograms Representing Information about Floor Exit
Path Lighting (EXITl, SMOKELIG, FLOORLIG).

SLIDE1

SLIDE2

Abstract

Very Abstract

Figure 3. The Two Pictograms Representing Instructions for the Usage of
Emergency Exit Slides (SLIDE1, SLIDE2).

ELECTROl

ELECTR02

Abstract

Naturalistic

Figure 4. The Two Pictograms Representing the Prohibition to Use Certain
Kinds of Electronic Equipment (ELECTROl, ELECTR02).

The 13 selected pictograms were similar to those on a total of 31 cards
in the safety card sample. Thirteen airlines were represented with symbols:
five from the U.S. (Continental®, Eastern®, Pan American®, United®, and
U.S. Air®), five from Europe (Euroberlin France®, Hapag-Lloyd®,
Lufthansa®, LTU®, and Luxair®), and three from Asia (Cathay Pacific®,
Garuda Indonesia®, and Singapore Airlines®). Appendix H contains the
pictograms used in the test and information about those cards whose symbols
they resembled.
All symbols were redrawn by the researcher in a fixed size. Those
pictograms which were originally circular or square were drawn in the size
100 mm x 100 mm for master prints. On the tests, the pictograms were
reduced to a size of 50 mm x 50 mm. The two originally rectangular
pictograms were redrawn in a size of 100 mm x 150 mm for the master prints
and then reduced to 50 mm x 75 mm on the test. While three colors (black,
blue, red) were used on the larger master prints, only pictograms in
monochrome black/grey/white appeared on the actual tests. The symbols
were redrawn to enhance the print-quality of the pictograms on the test and
to exclude any biases induced by colors or different sizes.
Since the operation of over-wing exit doors are depicted differently on
safety cards, one question in the test focused on this topic. The researcher
prepared a perspective line-drawing of an over-wing exit row as seen from
the aisle. The master copy was of the size 150 mm x 150 mm, later to be
reduced to 63 mm x 63 mm for the test. Five copies were produced, in which
the position of the door was varied. The first drawing showed that the door
was to be removed. Following the options offered on current safety cards (see
Review of the Related Literature), the other four pictorial representations
showed four answer choices of where to put the emergency exit door once

removed from the frame: (a) on the seats in front of the exit row, (b) outside
the plane, (c) on the seats in the exit row, or (d) on the seats behind the exit
row. The pictures were included to avoid misunderstandings among the
subjects regarding the four options. Additionally, the drawings helped
subjects without air travel experience to imagine the situation.
Because subjects with previous exposure to air travel were thought to
answer a question regarding the color-coding of exits on aircraft depending
upon their experience, the question was posed in two ways: The first part of
the question (What color most likely indicates an exit?) was intended to get
information about the subjects1 knowledge and previous experience and to
prevent misunderstandings due to possible differences in experience and
favorization of a certain color. The second part (What color should be used?)
allowed subjects who had previous exposure to a certain color coding to
express their agreement or rejection of that particular color, while it also gave
subjects without previous flight experience the opportunity to indicate their
preferred color.
The last part of the instrument collected biographical data from the
subjects, such as gender, age group, native language, country of origin,
university, and field of study. These data were intended to allow analysis for
extraneous variables (within-groups factors such as gender vs. the betweengroups factor, culture).

Test Instructions
The tests were given at different universities in several countries. To
exclude biases due to changes in administration of the tests, special
standardized test instructions were developed. The instructions focused on

administration as well as timing of the test and return of the survey forms to
the researcher. Detailed instructions were given.
The sentences to be read to the students were included in the test
instructions, so all subjects would receive the same directions. The
instructions also contained detailed information about the timing of the test
and the return of the survey forms to the researcher. The aim was to provide
the local test administrators with the simplest and least time-consuming
procedures.
The instructions which were originally developed in English were
translated by native speakers into German and French. Sample copies of the
test instructions can be found in Appendix I.

Design
The design approach of this study was a combination of both
descriptive techniques for data collection and causal-comparative methods for
data analysis. The study investigated differences among current university
students from different cultural backgrounds with regard to their
understanding and interpretation of aircraft passenger safety briefing cards.
To obtain the data, a combined questionnaire/opinionnaire was
administered at seven universities in five countries. The institutions were
selected from those to whom the researcher or faculty and students at EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University had contacts. The group included not only
technical universities but also universities without a concentration in
engineering or aviation. The narrowing of schools to those described did
ensure local support for the project, timely answers, a 100-percent response
rate, and thus more reliable data.
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To assure confidentiality of the tests, the survey was designed in a way
which did not allow the identification of particular respondents from the
answer sheets without an in-depth knowledge of the respective university
group. The only demographic data collected were gender, age group in broad
thirty-year intervals, country of origin, major field of study, and personal air
travel experience in broad intervals.
The causal-comparative method for data analysis was appropriate since
the study attempted to determine the cause for probable differences in the
understanding and interpretation of aircraft passenger safety briefing cards. In
a 4 x ( 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ) factorial arrangement, the subjects varied post-facto between
groups according to their culture (British, French, German, U.S.), as well as
within groups according to their field of study (Aero, Other), previous flight
experience (Yes, No), gender (Male, Female), and age (under 30, 30 and above).
The study attempted to determine whether the between-groups factor had a
significant influence on the subjects' answers when compared to the withingroups factors.
No variables among the subjects were manipulated by the researcher.
The test design was kept constant among all tests. All groups were
predetermined, according to the subjects' culture and field of study. Thus, the
experimental method was not indicated (Gay, 1987).

Limitations
The design of the study attempted to control for as many extraneous
variables as possible. Standardized test instructions were used to keep the
procedure as constant as possible. The questions were in the same order in all
tests to exclude differences due to a change in the order of questions. Native
speakers translated and checked the tests and the test instructions to exclude

any limitations that the usage of one language would have implied. Where
possible, pictorial representations complemented the test questions. The
subjects were exclusively university students, to restrict biases induced by
differences in educational level. Subgroups were formed to control for
variances in aviation knowledge.
There were, however, variables which the design of the study could
not control:
1. Although the local research assistants were provided with detailed
test instructions, the physical layout of the test environment as well as the
actual procedure used during the tests were beyond the control of the study.
2. The subjects were asked to give professional answers. Since no
direct incentive was offered to the students for completion of the test, the
motivation of the students towards the test was beyond the control of the
study.
3. The test was conveying information in writing and in pictures. The
pictures were of constant quality and location on all tests. Although native
speakers were used to translate the tests, subtle differences introduced during
the translations from English into French and German, however, might not
have been detected during the design. As shown earlier, verbal cross-cultural
communication is subject to possible misunderstandings. These subtle, but
perhaps significant differences were beyond the control of the study.
4. The limitation of the study to university students from four
relatively similar Western cultures might have introduced a bias towards less
distinct cultural differences. If, however, culture is to be determined as a
significant factor among the subjects from an otherwise somewhat
homogeneous group such as university students from Western democracies,

it can be assumed that these findings can be generalized towards much more
heterogeneous groups, such as nations in Europe and Africa or Asia.
5. Due to the selection of entire classes for the test, age, gender , and
previous flight experience could not be controlled. These factors must be
considered as extraneous variables during the data analysis.

Procedure
Pilot Tests
To determine validity and reliability of the instrument, the test/
questionnaire and the instructions were pre-tested during all stages of their
development. During the initial phases, a prototype test was administered
and discussed in a graduate level class on "Research Methods and Statistics"
(MAS 605) at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Findings from this
pilot-test were incorporated in the design of the instrument. The final draft
of the test/questionnaire was then pilot-tested in two classes at Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University: a Master's level class on "Human Factors in
Aviation" (MAS 604) and an undergraduate class "Introduction to
Psychology" (SS 220). After the review of the pilot-study, one question of the
test and one part of the instructions pertaining to the time necessary for
completion were changed slightly to exclude ambiguities which became
apparent during the pilot test.
In the initial design of the questionnaire/test, subjects displayed
problems regarding the question asking them "You are now studying in . . ."
Instead of answering with the country, as intended by the test design, the
students did answer this question with the name of their university. The
question was therefore amended with the printed statement "(country)" to
better reflect the intention.

The time for completion of the questionnaire had been estimated to be
30 to 45 minutes before the pilot tests. It became apparent during the pilot
study, however, that the tests could be completed by all subjects within 10 to
15 minutes. Therefore, the time stated in the instructions for completion of
the test was changed to 15 minutes.

Administration of the Tests
The test was administered at seven universities in five countries. The
questionnaires and test instructions in the respective language were sent to
the universities together with a self-addressed envelope and a cover letter
explaining the purpose of the study. Contacts at the universities were
professors, teachers, and assistants to whom the researcher or faculty and
students at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University had previous associations.
The local test administrators selected an entire class from the specified field of
study (aerospace or non-aerospace). Following the test instructions, the local
contacts administered the test to the students in the respective classes in one
session of approximately 20 to 25 minutes duration, including distribution
and collection of the forms.
During the test, the subjects were informed about the purpose of the
study and asked for their participation. They were advised not to sign their
name anywhere on the test to guarantee anonymity. The subjects were
informed that they had 15 minutes to complete the test, and that they would
be reminded after 10 minutes that 5 minutes were left for completion of the
test. The subjects were asked to answer the questions in the language of the
country they studied in (i.e., English in the U.K. and the U.S., French in
Belgium and France, and German in Germany).

After ten minutes, the test administrators informed the subjects that
five minutes were left to complete the test. The students were also asked to
make pure that they completed the questions soliciting biographical
information.
At the end of the 15 minutes, the test administrators asked the
participants to stop answering and to make sure that the biographical
questions were answered. If the subjects had not completed this part, they
were asked to do so at that time.
The answer sheets were collected by the test administrators and sent by
mail in the self-addressed envelopes back to the researcher at Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University. All tests were received completely and within the
time specified in the test instructions, except those from one university.
Since the number of responses from ENAC was not sufficient after the first
test, the test was again administered to other students to reach the targeted
total number of about 20 students. The answers from the additional test were
received in a separate envelope.
After the completed questionnaires/tests had been received by the
researcher at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, the results were
translated by native speakers where needed, categorized, and compiled into a
database that allowed statistical analyses. The collected data were used to
reject or accept the four null hypotheses derived from the previously stated
research hypotheses.

Analysis
General Approach
Two types of data were collected during the study. Most data were
nonparametric (ordinal). Other data, such as the design-preferences for safety
cards, were transformed into parametric weighted scores (interval data). Since
the two types of data existed, both the statistical methods for nonparametric data
(Chi-Square) as well as the Analysis-of-Variance method for parametric (interval)
data were employed. Throughout the analysis, it was attempted to avoid
introducing Type I errors into the study, i.e., declaring that a significant
difference due to culture existed, when, in fact, there was no difference. It was
felt by the researcher that this procedure would give more weight to those areas
where differences could be observed. Therefore, a conservative approach was
selected in determining whether significant differences existed between the
cultures.
One of the areas of concern during the analysis was the composition of the
tested groups. The subjects who participated in the test varied between the main
groups (British, French, German, U.S.) by their culture, i.e., native language.
Within the cultures, the subjects varied according to their field of study
(Aeronautics, Other), previous flight experience as passenger (yes, no), gender
(female, male), and age (under 30, 30 or older). This represented a 4 x ( 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 )
factorial arrangement.
The design of the study did not control for a balanced or representative
factorial arrangement of subjects among the groups. With the relatively small
number of subjects participating, some factorial groups were not represented at
all, or only with few subjects. In the French group, for example, only one female
subject was represented. This did not allow any statistical analysis by gender
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paired with native language when the French group was included. Other groups
were strongly biased with respect to age. Most (ten) of the 20 subjects who were
30 years of age or older came from the U.S. group, while only one subject from
the German group was 30 or older. Therefore, a full multiple analysis of variance
(ANOVA) combining the five factors language, field of study, previous flight
experience, gender, and age was not indicated. Instead, a three-fold approach
was selected to test for the variances according to culture.

All Subjects
In the first test, all subjects from the four main groups (British, French,
German, U.S.) were included. When indicated by the type of data, a one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the respective test answers as
the variable and native language as the factor. When ordinal data were
analyzed, a Chi-Square test was used. Since these tests included all subjects, they
also incorporated all possible biases due to the skewness of the test groups.
Therefore, if culture (i.e., native language) was found to have a significant (i.e.,
p<0.05) effect, it had to be tested whether this influence was caused by the
varying compositions of the groups with respect to age, gender, or field of study,
rather than by culture.

Highly Stratified Subgroup
It was possible that the one-way ANOVA or Chi-Square test incorporating
all subjects was inconclusive regarding a significant influence of culture.
Therefore, second one-way ANOVAs or Chi-Square tests were performed for all
hypotheses, using a highly stratified subgroup. A sufficient number of otherwise
uniform subjects was found among three main groups (French, German, U.S.)
which were to be analyzed for the research hypotheses. All students in this
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highly stratified group studied aeronautics, had previous flight experience as
passengers, were male, and under 30 years of age. From the French group, 16
students fulfilled these parameters. Twenty-four German students and 22 U.S.
students were represented in the highly stratified group. The five subjects from the
British group who fell into the category were not considered, if necessary for
analysis, due to the insufficient number of subjects from that subgroup.
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test for the
influence of culture (i.e., native language) among the subjects from the highly
stratified group for parametric data. For ordinal data, a Chi-Square test was
employed. If culture had a significant (p<0.05) effect on the test answers among
all subjects and among the highly stratified group, it was assumed that these results
could be generalized towards the respective populations. Conversely, if no
significant effect of culture was found for both groups (all, highly stratified), it was
assumed that there was no significant difference between the subjects in the
study due to their culture.
The highly stratified group included those subjects who studied aeronautics
and thus had considerable knowledge regarding aviation-related topics.
Therefore, it was not assumed that a lack of a significant difference by culture
within the highly stratified group necessarily meant that there was absolutely no
difference between subjects from different cultures. In contrast, the highly
stratified group was only used to confirm observed differences among all subjects.
In those cases where the highly stratified group would not confirm the influence of
culture found for all subjects, further tests were conducted.

Control Tests
1. Where the ANOVAs/Chi-Square tests for all subjects and for the highly
stratified group indicated a significant effect of culture, Tukey HSD pairwise
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comparisons or additional two-way Chi-Square tests were used to determine
which cultures differed significantly. Additionally, the direction of differences
according to culture was investigated.
2. To reach conclusive results in those cases where the results varied
considerably between all subjects and the highly stratified group (i.e., not significant
for one, but significant for the other group), the test answers were analyzed for
other variables, such as age, gender, previous flight experience, and field of study. For
each of the parametric factors, a Chi-Square test was performed to determine
whether the extraneous variables had a significant influence on the test results. If
one factor could be determined as significant (p<0.05), the subjects were
reordered according to this factor. Within the new stratified subgroups, a oneway ANOVA or Chi-Square test by language was performed to determine
whether culture had a significant influence on the test results besides the
previously identified extraneous variable. If no other factor was determined as
significant, pairwise t-tests/Chi-Square tests between the suspected groups were
performed. If the t-test/Chi-Square test was significant, it was concluded that
culture did have a significant influence on the subjects' answers.
3. No further tests were conducted if both the ANOVAs/Chi-Square tests
for all subjects and for the highly stratified group did not indicate a significant
influence of culture on the subjects' answers. It was concluded that in those
cases, culture did not have a significant influence on the subjects' answers.

Safety Card Design Features
Description
In question 2 of the questionnaire/test, the subjects were asked to indicate
the three features they would put the most emphasis on if they had to design a
passenger safety card. The subjects indicated their design preferences with the

numbers 1,2, and 3, where 1 indicated the most important item. Tables 6,7, and
8 show the distribution of the design features by native language.

Table 6
First Design Choices in Percents by Country

Colors
Drawings
Durability
Language
Photos
Size
Words

British
0.00
66.67
3.70
11.11
14.81
0.00
3.70

French
0.00
67.57
2.70
27.03
0.00
0.00
2.70

100.00
27

100.00
37

Total
N

German
2.04
67.35
0.00
20.41
4.08
0.00
4.08
100.00
49

US
0.00
43.24
5.41
5.41
32.43
2.70
10.81
100.00
37

Total
0.67
61.33
2.67
16.67
12.00
0.67
5.33
100.00
150

N
1
92
4
25
18
1
8

Table 6 indicates that 61.3% of the subjects selected drawings/pictograms
as their first choice. It is notable that, although a relative majority of 43.2% of the
U.S. subjects also selected drawings as their first choice, this proportion was
considerably lower than for the British (66.7%), French (67.6%), or German
(67.4%) groups. Photos, however, were selected by 32.4% of the U.S. subjects.
And while photos were chosen by 14.8% of the British subjects, no French
student and only 4% of the German students decided in favor of photos for their
first design choice.
Any form of written instructions was chosen by 22% of all subjects as a
first choice: 16.67% selected multiple languages, while 5.33% of all subjects
favored words/writing. About 27% of the French, 20% of the German, 11% of
the British subjects, and 5% of the U.S. subjects chose multiple languages. Words

were selected by 4% of the German students, 10.8% of the U.S. subjects,
the French, and 3.7% of the British subjects.

Table 7
Second Design Choices in Percents by Country

Colors
Drawings
Durability
Language
Photos
Size
Words
Total
N

British
11.11
7.41
7.41
25.93
11.11
0.00
37.04
100.00
27

French
21.62
24.32
5.41
24.32
16.22
2.70
5.41
100.00
37

German
14.29
10.20
2.04
55.10
4.08
8.16
6.12
100.00
49

US
13.51
27.03
0.00
16.22
8.11
10.81
24.32
100.00
37

Total
15.33
17.33
3.33
32.67
9.33
6.00
16.00
100.00
150

Table 8
Third Design Choices in Percents by Country

Colors
Drawings
Durability
Language
Photos
Size
Words
Total
N

British
14.81
0.00
14.81
25.93
0.00
14.81
29.63
100.00
27

French
German
8.11
28.57
14.29
5.41
18.92
6.12
8.16
21.62
16.22
0.00
20.41
5.41
22.45
24.32

US
13.51
2.70
2.70
24.32
10.81
16.22
29.73

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
37

Total
17.33
6.67
10.00
18.67
6.67
14.67
26.00
100.00
150
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As indicated in Tables 7 and 8, worded instructions (i.e., words or
multiple languages) became more emphasized as second and third design
choices, whereas pictorial representations such as drawings and photos were
primarily selected as the first design choice. This indicates that graphics were
widely accepted by the subjects in the test as a primary means of conveying
safety-related information. Approximately one-third of the subjects indicated
that they liked colored representations. Color, however, was mostly selected as a
second or third choice.

Drawings as a Design Feature
The reviewed literature indicated an emphasis on non-verbal
communication in the high-context French culture and a French preference for
graphic stimuli. In the low-context German culture, however, a high demand for
detailed, preferably printed information was suggested. Therefore, it was
hypothesized that French subjects would choose graphic representations (i.e.,
drawings) more often than German subjects when being asked about their design
preferences on aircraft passenger briefing cards (Hypothesis la).
In order to consider the fact that the subjects could indicate their three
design preferences, two tests were conducted. In the first test (non-weighted), the
mentioning of a design choice by a subject (regardless of whether as first, second,
or third choice) awarded that design feature one point each. The scores were
used as ordinal data. Figure 5 shows the percentages of subjects by culture who
chose drawings as a design feature.
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were awarded. For selection as a second choice, this feature received six points,
and three points for being chosen as a third choice. No points were awarded if
the feature was not mentioned at all by the subject. Using the weighted scores as
interval data, the maximum mean score was 9.0, if all subjects in a group selected
a feature as their first choice, while the minimum mean score was 0.0 if the
feature was not mentioned at all.
Using the weighted scores as ordinal data, a Chi-Square test was conducted.
Although significant differences due to culture among all subjects could be
observed (X2=26.882, d/=9, p=0.002), no significant differences between the
German and the French group were found: X2=5.252, d/=3, p=0.154.
Since the weighted scores were primarily intended as interval data, a oneway analysis of variance using the weighted scores was conducted. Culture was
found to have a major effect at the p-0.037 level (F=2.909) for all subjects. Further
analysis using a Tukey HSD comparison revealed a significant (p=0.026)
difference between the U.S. (M=5.595, 3.752) and the French (M=7.703, SD=2.184)
groups. However, no significant differences between the German group
(M=7.102, 3.043) and the other groups were found. An ANOVA for the highly
stratified group did confirm the absence of a significant difference between the
German and French groups. For the highly stratified group, no significant
differences between any cultures were found (F (3, 63)=2.164, p=0.101).
Significant differences in employing drawings as a design preference for
aircraft passenger safety briefing cards were observed between the French and
the U.S. groups for all students. Considering the weighted and non-weighted scores,
no significant differences, however, were found between the German and the
French group regarding the employment of drawings on passenger safety
briefing cards. Hypothesis I stated an assumed significant difference between

the French and German groups and a specific direction of hypothesized
difference which was not observed. Therefore, Hypothesis la was rejected.

Worded Instructions as a Design Preference
To test Hypothesis lb, which stated that German subjects would select
written instructions significantly more often than French subjects, the same
principle of weighted and non-weighted scores as for drawings was used. Since the
test question offered two features in the list which employed words (multiple
languages and words/writing), a combined weighted and a combined nonweighted score for worded instructions was determined: For each of the two
features, the normal weighted and non-weighted scores were calculated. The
respective scores from the features were then added to a combined weighted or
non-weighted score. Since each feature could only be mentioned once, the
maximum possible mean score would have been M=15 (=9+6) for the combined
weighted score, if all subjects selected one feature as their first choice, and the
other feature as their second choice, respectively. The minimum possible mean
score would have been 0, if none of the subjects mentioned any of the two
features. Figure 6 shows the percentages of subjects by culture who chose
worded instructions as a design feature for aircraft passenger safety cards.
The Chi-Square test for the non-weighted scores found no significant
differences due to culture for all subjects: X2=2.1258, d/=2, p=0.3455. In a
control-test, no significant differences were observed between the German and
the French groups: X2=2.037,rf/=2,p=0.3612.
Conducting the respective ANOVAs for all subjects and the highly stratified
group, no significant differences were observed between any of the groups. For
the combined weighted score, the values were F (3,146)=1.131, p=0.339 for all
subjects, and F(3, 63)=1.111, p=0.352 for the highly stratified group.
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Photos as a Feature in the Design of Safety Cards
The data regarding the design preferences for aircraft passenger safety
briefing cards were also analyzed regarding the preference for photos as a design
feature. Photos were used relatively widely on U.S. safety cards but on only very
few European cards. Additionally, it was hypothesized that photos would
appeal to the realistic U.S. communication style suggested by the literature.
Thus, Hypothesis II stated that U.S. subjects would indicate a higher preference
for photos as a design feature on safety cards than European subjects.
Using the same design approach as for Hypothesis I, one-way ANOVAs
were performed for all subjects and the highly stratified group with the weighted
scores as the variables (interval data). The analyses revealed significant
differences in the design preferences between the U.S. and the German groups
and between the U.S. and the French groups for the weighted scores. U.S. subjects
did choose photos significantly more often than German or French subjects. For
the weighted scores and all subjects, the values were: F(3,146)=7.747, p<0.0005,
with Tukey HSD pairwise probabilities of p=0.007 between the French and U.S.
groups and p<0.0005 between the German and the U.S. groups. No significant
differences were found between the German and the French groups, the U.S. and
the British, or the British and the French and German groups. These results were
confirmed by the ANOVA for the highly stratified group: F(3, 63)=4.530, p=0.006.
Figure 7 shows the percentages of subjects by culture who chose photos as a
design feature for all subjects.
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Figure 7. Photos as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Design Choices for all Subjects. Percentage
of Subjects by Culture.
For the non-weighted scores, significant differences could be observed
between the U.S. and the German groups. With X2=19.990, df=3, p=0.0002 for all
subjects, and a pairwise X2=20.070, df=l, p<0.0005, U.S. subjects chose photos
more often than those from Germany. Since only four German subjects selected
photos, one cell of the matrix was sparse. A Fisher exact test supported p<0.0005
between the German and the U.S. groups. The fact that the French group did not
significantly differ from the U.S. group for the non-weighted scores (X2=2.720,
df=l, p=0.0991; Fisher exact test: p=0.1570) was attributed to the significant
number of French subjects who mentioned photos as a second and third design
choice.

There was no general significant difference between European and U.S.
subjects regarding a preference for photos on safety cards. However, significant
differences could be observed between the German and the U.S. groups and
(when only considering the weighted scores) between the U.S. and the French
groups. Therefore, the original Hypothesis II had to be rejected, since the
differences were not uniform between the European and the U.S. groups.

Color-Coding of Exit Lights
Subjects were asked to indicate which color they thought indicated an exit
in aircraft floor lighting (current method). The subjects also indicated which color
- in their opinion - should be used for this purpose (preferred option). Since exit
signs in buildings are red in the U.S., while they are green in wide parts of
Europe, it was hypothesized that U.S. subjects would choose red over other
colors, whereas Europeans would prefer green to other colors (Hypothesis III).
Highly significant differences regarding the observations and preferences
for exit light color coding were found between the subjects from the U.S. and
those from Europe. Chi-Square tests for both the current method and the preferred
option showed significant differences when incorporating all color choices: For
the current method and all subjects, culture had a significant influence at p<0.00005
(X2=46.219, d/=12). This finding was supported by the Chi-Square test for the
current method and the highly stratified group: X2=40.3647, d/=12, p=0.0001. Highly
significant differences were also found for the preferred option at X2=42.4203,
rf/=15, p=0.0002 for all subjects, and X2=38.4950, d/=15, p=0.0008 for the highly
stratified group. The higher number of degrees of freedom for the preferred
option resulted from two subjects who did not answer the question.
Further investigation of the test answered showed that subjects from the
U.S. significantly more often chose red, while the European subjects preferred
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green. Figures 8 shows the percentages of subjects by culture according to the
color they selected as the current method for all subjects. The almost even
distribution of the German subjects between red and green can possibly be
explained by previous experiences, in which the subjects observed red as a color
on aircraft from U.S. airlines. The subjects studied in Berlin. Until the end of the
special air traffic rules in 1990, U.S. air carriers transported a high proportion of
the passengers to and from Berlin.
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Figure 9. Color Coding of Exit in Floor Lighting. Comparison of Red and Green
as the Current Method for all Subjects. Percentage of Subjects by Culture.

BLUE

GREEN

RED

WHITE

YELLOW

Figure 10. Color Coding of Exit in Floor Lighting. Indicated Preferred Option for
all Subjects. Percentage of Subjects by Culture.
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As shown in Figure 10, the variations between the European groups
became smaller regarding the preferred option: 66.7% of the British, 59.5% of the
French, and 61.2% of the German subjects chose green as their preference. Only
13.5% of the U.S. subjects selected green. For red, the ratios reversed: 78.4% of
the U.S. subjects chose red, while 22.2% of the British, 27.0% of the French, and
26.5% of the Germans among all subjects selected red. The same general ratios
could be observed among the highly stratified group. Figure 11 compares the
selection of RED and GREEN for the preferred option for all subjects.
The Chi-Square tests indicated highly significant differences between the
U.S. and the European subjects regarding the selection of colors for floor lighting
to code emergency exits. These differences were in the expected direction.
Therefore, Hypothesis III was accepted.

100.0 -r

0 GREEN
ElRED

80.0 -u

78.4

60.0

CD

British

French

German

U.S.

Figure 11. Color Coding of Exits in Floor Lighting. Comparison of Red and
Green as the Preferred Option for all Subjects. Percentage of Subjects by Culture.
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Interpretation of Pictograms
In the test, 13 pictograms similar to those on current aircraft passenger
safety briefing cards were presented. The subjects were asked to describe in a
few words what they thought the symbols represented most likely. An example
was given to illustrate the type of requested answer. The pictogram given as an
example showed a cigar and a pipe within a typical prohibition sign (Figure 12).
The example of the type of requested answer was therefore: "Do not smoke cigars
or pipes" It was hypothesized that, due to the differing communication styles
identified in the literature, the interpretation of pictograms would vary by
culture (Hypothsis IV).

Figure 12. Example Given in the Test: "Do Not Smoke Cigars or Pipes "

Approach
The subjects answered these open-ended questions with interpretations in
their own words. No immediate values such as in multiple-choice tests could be
assigned to their answers. To assess the understanding and interpretation of the
symbols by the subjects and to allow statistical analyses, the students' answers
were graded by the researcher. Three scoring levels were used:
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1. An answer was considered to be correct and complete when all main
safety information contained in the pictogram was stated by the subjects. The
complete and correct answer for the given example contained three basic parts.
The symbol showed (a) a cigar, (b) a pipe, and (c) the prohibition. Thus, any
answer mentioning all three parts would have been graded as correct and complete
and been awarded the value +1.0.
2. An incomplete but safe answer was one where the probable outcome of
the subject's understanding and interpretation of the pictogram as indicated by
the answer would most likely not have adversely affected the subject's safety or
compliance with the underlying safety regulation. If, for example, a subject
answered "Do not smoke" or "Smoking prohibited" when interpreting the symbol
given as an example, this would not have adversely affected the subject's
compliance with the stated rule "Do not smoke cigars or pipes" The answer,
however, would also not have been correct and complete, since smoking of
cigarettes, for example, was not prohibited by the sign. An incomplete but safe
answer was scored as neutral and awarded the value 0.0.
3. If an answer was wrong or unsafe, the incorrect interpretation of the
symbol was either contrary to the intention of the pictogram, or it possibly
endangered the safety of the subject in an applicable situation. An example of a
wrong or unsafe answer for the pictogram "Do not smoke cigars or pipes" would, for
example, have been: "Smoking allowed" or "Cigars and pipes allowed." Since the
reviewed literature (e.g., Johnson, 1984; Barthelmess, 1985) indicated that
passenger inaction after aircraft accidents contributed significantly to the
occurrence of fatalities and injuries, it was also considered to be wrong or unsafe, if
no answer was given. Answers of this type were graded with a -1.0.
For each symbol, the different components of the pictogram were
reviewed, and the respective answers were graded according to the standardized

requirements. The scores for each pictogram were analyzed using the
aforementioned three-step process. The scores were used as ordinal data, since
no degree of unsafety or safety could be determined.

Categorizations
All symbols were reviewed regarding contents and intention. For each
pictogram, the components of a complete and correct answer were defined.
Acceptable incomplete but safe answers were specified. The subjects' answers
were then graded according to the categories.
Pictogram 1 (EXITl). This symbol showed the location of an overwing
emergency exit, as indicated by the different colored lights in the emergency
lighted floor path (Figure 13). For their answer to be scored as correct and
complete, the subjects had to mention both that an exit was located between the
seat rows as well as the indication via the floor path. "Follow floor lights to exit" or
"Emergency exit lighting" were examples of acceptable complete and correct answers.

Figure 13. Pictogram 1 (EXITl). Follow Floor Lights To Exit.
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An answer which only mentioned the exit (e.g., "Exit located between seat
rows" or "Exit this way") but not the floor path was considered to be incomplete but
safe. The subjects would probably have found the exit in an emergency.
Examples of wrong or unsafe answers given by subjects for this pictogram
were: "Follow arrow on floor to emergency exit" (there is no arrow on the floor in the
airplane), or "In an emergency, the seat row must be pushed to the forward marker to
use the emergency exit."
Pictogram 2 (SLIDE1). This pictogram indicated the correct and incorrect
ways of using an emergency exit slide (Figure 14). "Jump - do not sit" was one of
the most frequent complete and correct answers for this pictogram. Since the
important feature was the correct method (jump), an answer such as "Jump when
using exit slide" was also classified as complete and correct, although "do not sit" was
not mentioned.

Figure 14. Pictogram 2 (SLIDE1). Jump - do not sit.

Incomplete but safe answers did not mention the correct method (jump), but
noted the incorrect method (e.g., "Do not sit down", "Do not wait on top when using
exit slide"). Other answers from this category were "Accelerate before using slide" or
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"Use emergency slide quickly." Since it was not clear from the answers whether th(
subjects would actually jump, but perhaps sit down briefly before sliding down
the chute, these answers could not be categorized as complete and correct.
Some subjects gave wrong or unsafe answers such as "Do not jump onto the
emergency exit slide" or "Sit down before using exit slide." These answers
contradicted the intention of the symbol.
Pictogram 3 (HEELS1). This symbol was one of three showing the
instructions to remove high-heel shoes before using an emergency exit slide
(Figure 15). A complete and correct answer mentioned the instruction to remove
high-heel shoes, such as "Remove high-heel shoes," "Take off high heeled shoes," or
"Take of stilettos" (a term most often used by subjects from Hull).

Figure 15. Pictogram 3 (HEELS1). Remove High-Heel Shoes.

An incomplete but safe answer was "Remove shoes" Although the instruction
to remove all shoes is preferred by some airlines (e.g., Lufthansa, LTU, HapagLloyd), problems can emanate when delays occur, or when survivors have to
pass debris inside and outside the plane without shoes. Since the intent of the
instruction to remove high-heel shoes for the use of the emergency slide would
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have been fulfilled by removing all shoes, however, these answers were
considered to be incomplete but safe.
Most wrong or unsafe answers reversed the intention of the pictogram and
interpreted the symbol as a prohibition to take off shoes (e.g., "Do not take off
shoes" or "Prohibited to take off shoes").
Pictogram 4 (OXYGEN). The depiction of a mask with the printed symbol
O2 as an indication of the location and operation of an oxygen mask was
completely recognized by most subjects. Mentioning an oxygen mask was
considered a complete and correct answer (Figure 16).

Figure 16. Pictogram 4 (OXYGEN). Oxygen Mask.

It was not completely clear whether the subjects who answered "Poisenous
fumes present" or "Gas mask" realized the intention of the oxygen mask. Since they
most likely would have used the mask, these answers were categorized as
incomplete but safe.
The only two examples of wrong or unsafe answers for this pictogram were
"Danger of open fire" and "Tube supplies H2O." In all other cases when the

categorization was wrong or unsafe, it was due to the fact that no answer was
given.
Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl). This symbol was one of two prohibiting the
operation of certain electronic equipment aboard an aircraft. A cellular phone
and a radio were depicted within the general symbol for prohibition (Figure 17).
The correct and complete interpretation of the symbol in accordance with
applicable regulations would have been "Certain electronic equipment shall not be
used aboard the aircraft." The criterion for the classification of an answer as correct
and complete was, therefore, the mentioning of electronic items (such as radios or
telephones) and of the fact that these items should not be used. Examples of
complete and correct answers were "Do not use transistors or portable phones" or "Do
not use equipment that may interfere with frequency."

Figure 17. Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl). Do Not Use Certain Electronic Equipment.

Since the regulations only prohibit the operation of electronic equipment,
but do allow the carriage of these items aboard a plane, any answer that did not
mention the usage was not considered complete and correct. Thus, answers such
as "No radios or telephones" or "Radio devices prohibited" were considered to be
incomplete but safe.
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Wrong or unsafe answers did not assure that the equipment was not used
(if not even carried). An example was "Radio reception technically impossible"

which would probably have a reader try the operation of such equipment
regardless of the statement.
Pictogram 6 (HEELS2). Although the picture was more abstract (Figure
18), the intention of this symbol was equal to that of Pictogram 3 (HEELSl).
Thus, the same criteria were used.

Figure 18. Pictogram 6 (HEELS2). Remove High-Heel Shoes.

Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG). This symbol had two components: A floor
guidance system (heavy dashed line) and the instruction to stay close to the
ground/crawl under smoke in case of a fire (Figure 19). A complete and correct
answer for this symbol mentioned both parts of the instructions (e.g., "In case of
smoke, follow the emergency exit markings on the floor").

Incomplete but safe answers mostly did not mention the exit path marking
on the floor but recognized the need to stay below the smoke in case of fire and
to crawl towards an emergency exit. Since these answers indicated the correct
interpretation of the immediate danger of smoke inhalation, which would result
in more time to search for an exit, they were categorized as incomplete but safe.
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Figure 19. Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG). Crawl under Smoke and Follow Floor
Markings.

Examples of wrong or unsafe answers were "Lie down on the floor"
(potentially dangerous) and "Life vests are located under the seats" The latter
interpretation was mentioned several times by subjects from different groups.
Pictogram 8 (SLIDE2). The intention of this symbol (Figure 20) was equal
to that of Pictogram 2 (SLIDEl). Therefore, the same categorizations were used.
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Pictogram 9 (DITCH). The depiction of a stylized airplane on water was
used on several cards as an indication of "In case of an emergency landing on water,
... [to be followed by instructionsf (Figure 21). The categorization used for this
symbol was very strict: Only answers mentioning the intention of the pictogram
as an introduction to other instructions were graded as complete and correct.
Thus, answers which merely mentioned "Airplane on water" or "Ditching"
were only scored as incomplete but safe. Several wrong or unsafe interpretations
were noted, such as "Plane will float" (possibly dangerous), "Seaplane" (a common
answer), or "Seaplane landing area."

J

1

Figure 21. Pictogram 9 (DITCH). In Case of an Emergency Landing on Water,... [to
be followed by instructions].

Pictogram 10 (HEELS3). This symbol (Figure 22) had the same intention
as pictograms 3 and 6. Thus, the same classifications were used in the grading of
the answers. During the categorizations, it was noted that many subjects whose
answers were classified as wrong or unsafe indicated confusion as to whether the
symbol meant to remove or wear shoes.
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Figure 22. Pictogram 10 (HEELS3). Remove High-Heel Shoes.

Pictogram 11 (FLOORLIG). Similar to Pictogram 1 and 7, this symbol
presented the emergency exit floor lighting (Figure 23). A complete and correct
answer mentioned both the exit as well as the indication through the lighted
path.

%^m
Figure 23. Pictogram 11 (FLOORLIG). Colored Lights in the Floor Indicate an
Emergency Exit.
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Incomplete but safe answers recognized that the picture pertained to an exit,
but failed to mention that lights indicated the location. Although it is unclear
whether the subjects realized that the exit was marked by lights, they probably
would have remembered the very generic depiction of lamps in the picture when
looking for the exit.
Many wrong or unsafe answers stated that the exit location was actually
noted by a sign with the printed word "Exit." An example was "Exit is marked by
sign."
Pictogram 12 (ELECTR02). Having the same intention as pictogram 5,
this symbol depicted a radio crossed out by two diagonal bars (Figure 24).
Again, mentioning the fact that operation of such equipment (e.g., "Radios,"
"Transistors") was prohibited was necessary for the categorization as complete and
correct. Since the applicable rule was assumed not to be known widely among
the subjects, the mentioning of one type of equipment was sufficient, although
the regulations state that the operation of all electronic equipment is prohibited
unless specifically allowed.

Figure 24. Pictogram 12 (ELECTR02). Do Not Use Certain Electronic Equipment.
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Incomplete but safe answers did not mention the operation, but the carriage
of the specified equipment. Examples were "Do not carry radios," "Transistors
prohibited," or "No radios."
Wrong or unsafe answers mistook the symbol for a prohibition of noise, bul
did not limit the operation of the equipment. An example was "No loud music"
Pictogram 13 (BUTANE). The depiction of a crossed-out gas lighter was
found on the cards of one U.S. airline (U.S. Air®), together with the printed
explanation "No butane lighters". Only answers that mentioned "No gas lighter" or
"No butane lighter" were considered to be complete and correct, since the intention
of the symbol was to ban the operation of pressurized lighters due to the
possibility of high flames and explosions at reduced cabin air pressure during
flight.
Matches, other lighters, or open flames were not prohibited by the sign.
Since answers such as "No lighters," "No open/naked flames," or "No matches or
lighters" assured that butane lighters also would not been used, these answers
were categorized as incomplete but safe.

Figure 25. Pictogram 13 (BUTANE). Do Not Use Butane/Gas Lighters.
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Most entries in the category wrong or unsafe were due to a lack of an
answer. One answer, however, in this category was "Flammable." This answer
did not assure that gas lighters would not been used, since the subject would
perhaps make a mental connection between the pictogram and some part of
equipment on the plane.

Results
Performing Chi-Square tests by language between all subjects, culture was
determined to be of significant influence (p<0.05) for five of the 13 pictograms:
(a) Pictogram 1 (EXITl), (b) pictogram 2 (SLIDEl), (c) pictogram 5 (ELECTROl),
(d) pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG), and (e) pictogram 11 (ELECTR02). For the eight
other pictograms, no significant influence of culture on the interpretation and
understanding of the symbols was found among all subjects . Figure 26 shows the
p-values for the influence of culture found during the analysis for all subjects.
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Figure 26. Cultural Differences in Interpreting Safety Card Pictograms. p-Values
of Significance for all Subjects Using Chi-Square Tests.
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The results of the Chi-Square tests by culture for the subjects in the highly
stratified group (as defined earlier) confirmed a significant influence of culture on
the interpretation of the symbols for four of the aforementioned five pictograms:
Pictogram 1 (EXITl), pictogram 2 (SLIDEl), pictogram 5 (ELECTROl), and
pictogram 12 (ELECTR02).
For pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG), the Chi-Square test among the highly
stratified group did indicate a significant influence of culture at p=0.063, slightly
above the required level of p<0.05. Further analysis revealed that the significant
influence was found for all subjects between the British and the German groups
and between the British and the U.S. groups. The British group, however, was
not represented in the highly stratified group. Thus, the results from this group
could not show any differences between the respective groups. Appendix J
contains the test results in interpreting pictograms by culture for all subjects.
Pictogram 1 (EXITl). Significant differences due to culture were found
among all subjects with X2=28.92, p<0.0005, df=6 (Figure 27). The French subjects
did give considerably more wrong or unsafe answers than all other subjects: 38%
of the French answers were categorized as wrong or unsafe. However, only 2% of
the German, 8% of the U.S., and 11% of the British answers were identified as
wrong or unsafe. Most French wrong or unsafe answers indicated that the arrow
(fliche) used in the symbol was actually installed in the aisle. Another wrong
answer from the French group that was mentioned several times was "Ejection
seat." Significant differences were found at p=0.0221 between the British and the
French, at p=0.0001 between the French and the German, and at p=0.0098
between the French and the U.S. groups. Furthermore, significant differences
were observed between the British and the German groups at p=0.0394.
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Figure 27. Interpretation of Pictogram 1 (EXITl) for all Subjects. Percentage of
Subjects by Culture.
The Chi-Square test for the highly stratified group confirmed the
significant differences between the French and the other groups at X2=27.19,
p<0.0005, d/=6. It was concluded that culture had a significant effect on the
interpretation of pictogram 1.
Pictogram 2 (SLIDEl). Significant differences due to culture were found
among all subjects in the interpretation of pictogram 2 (Figure 28). The ChiSquare test for all subjects showed a significant difference at X2=15.71, p=0.015,
df=6 between the German and the French groups (pairwise probability p=0.0132),
as well as between the German and the British groups (pairwise probability
p=0.0219). No significant differences were observed between the British and the
French groups, or between the U.S. and any other groups.
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Figure 28. Interpretation of Pictogram 2 (SLIDEl) for all Subjects. Percentage of
Subjects by Culture.
For the highly stratified group, the Chi-Square test confirmed significant
differences at p=0.0001 (X2=13.204, d/=6). Further evaluation of the test scores
revealed that the significant differences in the interpretation of pictogram 2 due
to culture resulted from the comparatively high number of German answers that
were classified as incomplete but safe. In this category, 24.49% of German answers
were found, in contrast to only 3.7% of the French, 5.41% of the British, and
10.81% of the U.S. answers. Many German subjects did not include the correct
method (jump) in their answers but used general statements which did not clarify
whether they would jump down the emergency slide. Examples of such answers

were"Use slide as quickly as possible," "Do not hesitate on top of the slide," or "Don't
stay seated on slide."

The analysis of the data suggested significant differences due to culture
between the German and the British and French subjects. It was concluded that
culture had a significant main effect on the interpretation of pictogram 2.
Pictogram 3 (HEELS1). The analysis of the answers for pictogram 3 did
not suggest any significant influence of culture on the subjects' answers for any
group (X2=9.928, df=6, p=0.128). The percentages of subjects answering with a
correct and complete answer did vary between 70% and 89%, however not
significantly. Subjects from all cultures did recognize and describe the symbol at
a high level of correctness. It was concluded that culture had no significant main
effect on the interpretation of pictogram 3.
Pictogram 4 (OXYGEN). Many subjects in the pre-study pilot test had
indicated that they considered the symbol for supplemental oxygen to be a
particularly bad pictorial representation. However, this symbol received one of
the highest overall rate of recognition of all pictograms in the test. More than
90% of subjects from all cultures described the symbol with a complete and correct
answer, and only six of the 150 subjects did give a wrong or unsafe answer. No
significant differences across cultures were observed in the analysis with
(X2=0.544,rf/=6,p=0.997) for all subjects. Thus, it was concluded that culture had
no significant influence on the understanding and interpretation of pictogram 4.
Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl). For the symbol prohibiting the use of
electronic equipment aboard an aircraft, significant main effects of culture on the
answers were found. The Chi-Square test and the subsequent pairwise
comparisons for all subjects showed at X2=25.603, d/=6, p<0.0005 cultural
differences between the U.S. and the French groups (p=0.0003), and between the
U.S. and the German groups (p<0.0001). No significant differences were found
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between the U.S. and the British groups (p=0.3001) or between the German and
the French (p=0.6779) groups. Significant differences were again found when
comapring the British and German (p=0.0212) groups, as well as the British and
the French groups (p=0.0154). The observed differences were confirmed for the
highly stratified group at X2=l 1.226,rf/=4,p=0.0241, with significant differences
between the German and the U.S., and the French and U.S. groups.

80.0

British

French

German

U.S.

Figure 29. Interpretation of Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl) for all Subjects. Percentage
of Subjects by Culture.
The test results were reviewed more closely to determine the reason for
the significant differences in the mean scores of the U.S. and French, and U.S. and
German subjects (Figure 29). More than three-quarters of the U.S. answers

(75.68%) and almost two-thirds of the British answers were categorized as
incomplete but safe. However, only 30.61% of the answers from the German and
32.43% from the French group were listed in this category. The reason for this
difference was found to be the preference of U.S. (and British) subjects for the
short answer "No radios or telephones." While this answer was safe, it was
ambiguous as to whether the subjects did correctly interpreted that only the use
of electronic equipment was prohibited, whereas the carriage of such items was
allowed. Fewer subjects from the U.S. (and British) groups than from the French
and German groups used a version of the complete and correct answer "Do not use
radios or telephones." A possible explanation for this difference could be the brief
and to-the-point communication style in the English language and the U.S.
preference for short, headline-type statements. These characteristics were
suggested by the reviewed literature. From the results, it was concluded that
culture did significantly influence the interpretation of pictogram 5.
Pictogram 6 (HEELS2). This symbol was the second of three pictorial
representations of instructions to remove high-heel shoes before using
emergency exit slides. More than 70% of all subjects gave a complete and correct
answer: 75.68% of the French, 75.51% of the German, and 75.68% of the U.S.
answers were complete and correct. Only 59.26% of the British subjects gave
answers in this category. The reversed situation was true for the wrong or unsafe
answers: More British (18.52%) answers than French (2.70%), German (2.04%), or
U.S. (5.41%>) answers were found. However, the Chi-Square test for all subjects
did not indicate a difference beyond the required level of significance of p<0.05.
The results were X2=9.980, df=6, p=0.125.
Further study of the test answers of the British subjects indicated that the
wrong or unsafe answers in that group resulted from several "Don't know" entries.
One subject answered "Do not obstruct aisle with loose shoes - not clear at all." Since
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the statistical analysis did not reveal any significant differences, it was concluded
that culture had no main effect on the interpretation of pictogram 6.
Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG). The Chi-Square test for all subjects indicated
significant differences due to culture at X2=l8.978, df-6, p=0.004. Pairwise ChiSquare tests revealed significant differences between the British and the German
(p=0.0303) and between the British and the U.S. groups (p=0.0225). The reason
was the variation of entries in the different categories: No British answer, but
16.22% of the French, 20.41% of the German, and 8.11% of the U.S. answers were
categorized as wrong or unclear, mostly because no answer was given (Figure#30).

80.0

H Wrong or Unsafe
70.3

• Incomplete but Safe
H Complete and Correct

60.0

British

French

German

U.S.

Figure 30. Interpretation of Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG) for all Subjects. Percentage
of Subjects by Culture.

The reverse ratios were found for the correct and complete answers: Here,
21.62% of the U.S., 35.14% of the French, 48.98% of the German, and 51.85% of
the British subjects indicated both the danger from smoke and the emergency exit
path lighting. Most answers from U.S. subjects (70.27%) lacked the information
about the floor marking, and thus were categorized as incomplete but safe.
Review of the scores for the highly stratified group did not confirm the
results for all subjects, since the British group was not represented. British
subjects gave relatively more positive answers than subjects from other cultures,
especially from the U.S. The statistical analysis found significant effects of
culture on the interpretation of pictogram 7.
Pictogram 8 (SLIDE 2). The intention of this symbol was equal to that of
pictogram 2 (SLIDEl). However, in contrast to the analysis for pictogram 2, no
significant differences (p=0.125) due to culture were found for this symbol. For
all subjects, the German answers did considerably more often (79.59% vs. 69.39%)
mention the correct method of using an exit slide (jump). Furthermore, the
percentages of complete and correct French (70.27% vs. 94.59%) and British (92.59%
vs. 96.30%) answers reduced, alleviating the differences observed between the
cultures for SLIDEl to p=0.125 for SLIDE2. These results were confirmed by the
Chi-Square test for the highly stratified group (p=0.0627). It was, therefore,
concluded, that culture had no main effect on the interpretation of pictogram 8.
Pictogram 9 (DITCH). This symbol was similar to one found during the
review of current safety cards on several German and one U.S. card. Its complete
and correct meaning was "In case of ditching... [to be followed by instructions]." As
indicated before, the subjects were graded very strictly. For all subjects, this
symbol was incorrectly interpreted by almost half of the subjects (46%). Only
54% of all subjects gave an incomplete but safe (41.33%) or complete and correct
answer (12.67%). Sixty-nine subjects, however, gave a wrong or unsafe answer.

Most wrong or unsafe answers interpreted the pictogram as a seaplane (wrong), or
as an indication that the plane will float (unsafe).
No significant influence of culture could be observed for all subjects:
X2=5.996,rf/=6,p=0.4236. These results were confirmed with X2=0.9484, d/=4,
p=0.9175 for the highly stratified group. It was concluded that culture had no
significant main effect on the interpretation of pictogram 9.
Pictogram 10 (HEELS3). The third symbol depicting the instruction to
remove high-heel shoes showed the lowest overall level of recognition of those
three pictograms. The Chi-Square test for all subjects revealed no significant
differences by culture at X2=l 0.3645, df=6, p=0.1101. Pairwise comparisons,
however, indicated a significant difference between the German and the U.S.
groups at p=0.0168. Further analysis of the answers showed that almost 50% of
the German subjects gave a complete and correct answer, whereas the percentage
of complete and correct answers for the U.S. group was 21.62%. The reversal was
found for wrong or unsafe answers: Only 10.20% of the German answers, but
27.03% of the U.S. answers were in this category. Most wrong or unsafe U.S.
answers were due to the absence of any answer. Common, however, among the
28 subjects from all cultures who gave such answers was confusion as to whether
the symbol meant to remove or wear shoes.
The Chi-Square test for the highly stratified group, however, showed
significant differences at X2=12.7228, df=4, p=0.0127 due to culture. The same
difference between the U.S. and the German groups as for all subjects could be
observed. While 36% of the U.S. subjects in the highly stratified group gave a
complete and correct answer, 54% of the German subjects did so. In contrast, 32%
of the U.S. subjects gave a wrong or unsafe answer, while only 8% of the German
subjects gave such an answer. Although significant differences between the
German and the U.S. groups could be observed, these differences were not large
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enough to influence the Chi-Square test for all subjects. It was, therefore,
concluded that culture had no significant main effect on the interpretation of
pictogram 10.
Pictogram 11 (FLOORLIG). While two-thirds (66%) of all subjects gave a
complete and correct answer, 22.67% responded with an incomplete but safe
interpretation; and 11.33% of all subjects gave a wrong or unsafe answer. With
X2=8.4509,rf/=6,p=0.207, the Chi-Square test for all subjects did not indicate
significant differences due to culture for pictogram 11. Additionally, no
significant differences were found among paired groups or within the highly
stratified group.
Pictogram 12 (ELECTR02). Significant main effects for the influence of
culture on the interpretation of pictogram 12 were suggested by the Chi-Square
test for all subjects with X2=19.606,rf/=6,p=0.0033. Pairwise comparisons showed
a significant difference between the German and the U.S. groups at p=0.0003,
between the French and the U.S. at p-0.0413, and between the British and the
U.S. groups at p=0.0197. No other significant differences were observed. Figure
31 shows the percentages for all subjects.
The significant difference due to culture between the U.S. and the German
groups were confirmed by the Chi-Square test for the highly stratified group at
X2=11.300,rf/=4,p=0.0234. No significant differences between any of the other
groups were found.
Further analysis of the results supported the findings for pictogram 5
(ELECTROl). Again, U.S. subjects did considerably more often (94.59%) give an
incomplete but safe answer such as "No radios" than the German subjects (55.10%).
Conversely, a significantly higher proportion of German subjects (40.82%)
indicated the complete and correct answer "Do not use radios" than subjects from the
U.S. group (5.41%). The results were consistent with the results for pictogram 5.
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It was concluded that culture had a significant main effect on the interpretation
of pictogram 12.
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p=0.3171). Thus, it was concluded that culture had no significant effect on the
interpretation of pictogram 13.

Other Influences on the Interpretation of Safety Cards
In separate Chi-Square tests, the subjects' interpretations of the symbols
were investigated for significant main effects due to age, gender, field of study,
or flight experience. The Chi-Square tests were conducted to determine whether
the differences observed for the different cultures were related to the other
factors.
Age. For 11 of the 13 pictograms, age had no significant main effect. The
Chi-Square test showed a significant influence, however, for pictogram 4
(OXYGEN) and pictogram 8 (SLIDE2). With X2=7.8915, df=2, p=0.0193, age was a
main factor in the answers for pictogram 4. The 120 students under 30 gave with
95.3% more complete and correct answers than the 30 subjects 30 years of age or
older (80%). With X2=9.0733, df=2, p=0.0107, age also had a significant influence
on the interpretation of pictogram 8. The group under 30 overall gave better
answers than the older subjects. Since no significant differences between the
cultures were found for the two pictograms, it was concluded that the influence
of age did not interfere with those findings.
Gender. No significant influence of gender was found for any of the
symbols in the test except for pictogram 6 (HEELS2). With X2=15.551, d/=2,
p=0.0004, the 34 female subjects gave significantly less correct and complete
answers than the 116 male test participants. A review of the test scores showed
that the difference was due to the fact that women considerably less often
specified that only high-heel shoes were to be removed. Instead, female subjects
answered with a general "No shoes." A possible explanation for this result could
be that the shoe depicted in pictogram 6 was not close enough to a realistic
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representation of a high-heel shoe to be interpreted as such. HEELS2, however,
was not found to be significantly influenced by culture. Thus, further analyses
rearding this pictogram were not performed.
Field of Study. Of the 34 female subjects in the study, 28 studied in a field
other than aeronautics. Therefore, the aeronautics group and the other group were
strongly biased by gender. Since a highly significant difference was found
between the genders in the interpretation of pictogram 6 (HEELS3), this
difference was reflected in the significant influence between the aeronautics and
the other group (X2=11.159, df=2, p=0.0038). The field of study had no significant
main effect on the interpretation of any other symbol.
Flight Experience. For two symbols, pictogram 8 (SLIDE2) and pictogram
9 (DITCH), previous flight experience had a significant main effect. Experience
was found to influence the interpretations for SLIDE2 at X2=9.078,rf/=2,p=0.0107.
While 81% of the subjects with experience gave a complete and correct answer,
only 60% of the subjects without experience did so. However, it must be noted
that only 15 of the 150 subjects in the test had no previous flight experience as
passenger. With X2=8.1346, df=2, p=0.0171, experience also had an influence on
the interpretation of pictogram 9 (DITCH). Again, the 15 subjects without flight
experience gave significantly fewer correct answers than the 135 subjects with
previous experience as an aircraft passenger. Subjects without experience mostly
mistook the symbol for the depiction of a floatplane or as the capability of the
aircraft to float. No significant influence of flight experience on the cultural
comparisons were noted.

Summary
Significant main effects of culture on the interpretation and understanding
of pictograms similar to those used on current safety cards were observed. For
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five of the 13 presented symbol, culture had a significant influence between
different groups at varying degrees. Hypothesis IV stated that the number of
correct answers would vary between subjects according to their culture. Since
significant variations were found for at least five of the 13 pictograms,
Hypothesis IV was accepted.

Brief Comparison of the Overall Effectiveness of the Pictograms
Although not integral part of the cross-cultural study, the overall
effectiveness of the symbols among all subjects was assessed. To give a brief
comparison, mean scores were calculated. Although the raw scores were ordinal,
it was assumed that an overall level of understanding could be represented by
using mean scores (Figure 31). If all subjects had chosen a complete and correct
answer, the mean score would be M=+1 .0. Converseley, it would be M=-1.0, if all
subjects in a group gave wrong or unsafe answers. For instructions which were
represented by more than one symbol, brief comparisons were made.
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Exit Lighting
Three pictograms (EXITl, SMOKELIG, and FLOORLIG) depicted the
lighted emergency exit floor path. Figure 33 shows the differences in the means
for the three pictograms for all subjects and by culture.

B EXITl
• SMOKELIG

96

Exit Lighting
Three pictograms (EXITl, SMOKELIG, and FLOORLIG) depicted the
lighted emergency exit floor path. Figure 33 shows the differences in the means
for the three pictograms for all subjects and by culture.

B EXITl
• SMOKELIG

96

Exit Lighting
Three pictograms (EXITl, SMOKELIG, and FLOORLIG) depicted the
lighted emergency exit floor path. Figure 33 shows the differences in the means
for the three pictograms for all subjects and by culture.

B EXITl
• SMOKELIG

Exit Lighting

96

97

High Heel Shoes
Three pictograms (HEELSl, HEELS2, and HEELS3) displayed the
instructions to remove high-heel shoes. Figure 34 shows the comparisons of
mean scores by culture for the three symbols.
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shoes (wrong or unsafe). One reason could be the absence of an arrow (or a
similar symbol) in HEELS3 which would have indicated the required direction of
movement (i.e., to remove shoes).

Exit Slides
The correct and fastest way of using exit slides during an emergency
evacuation was depicted in two pictograms. Both symbols (SLIDEl and SLIDE2)
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Electronic Equipment
Figure 36 shows the different mean scores for the pictograms depicting the
prohibition to use electronic equipment (ELECTROl, ELECTR02). Both
pictograms were effective in that almost no wrong or unsafe answers were given,
even if many subjects (especially from the U.S.) limited themselves towards
answers such as "No radios." These answers suggested that the subjects thought
that not only the use, but also the carriage of such equipment was not allowed.
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Figure 36 shows the different mean scores for the pictograms depicting the
prohibition to use electronic equipment (ELECTROl, ELECTR02). Both
pictograms were effective in that almost no wrong or unsafe answers were given,
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Conclusions
The results of this study indicate that culture can have a significant
main effect on the understanding and interpretation of safety information by
passengers from different countries. A self-developed aviation safety
test/questionnaire which focused on information found on aircraft passenger
safety briefing cards was administered to students from three cultures in
Western Europe and from the U.S. Significant culture-related differences at
p<0.05 were found.
The research hypotheses with respect to the understanding of the color
coding used for exits in aircraft floor lighting was accepted. Significant
differences were also found regarding the interpretation of symbols similar to
those used on current aircraft passenger safety information cards. It was
concluded that culture significantly influenced the subjects' answers in these
areas.
Some of the hypothesized differences, however, were not observed.
No general trend following the communication styles suggested by the
literature could be identified in the design preferences for aircraft passenger
safety cards. Still, significant variations were found among the cultures.
These differences were between other groups than hypothesized.
In all but two cases, the significant differences existed between the U.S.
group on one side, and the French and/or German groups on the other side.
Additionally, all observed differences were at least between one of the two
English-speaking groups (i.e., British or U.S.), and one of the groups from
Continental Europe (i.e., French, German). This led to the conclusion that
native language as one part of culture had a significant main effect. The
British and U.S. groups only varied where a convention regarding the color
100

101

used for exit floor lighting was involved. In all other cases, there was no
significant difference between the two groups. It was concluded that the
British and the U.S. groups not only used the same language, but also shared
other characteristics in communication style (e.g., a higher preference for
photos as compared to the French and German groups).
In two cases, significant differences were found between the French and
the German groups. No clear pattern could be observed. German answers
were very detailed and longer than those from all other groups. This,
however, did not induce significant differences in the correctness of the
answers. It was concluded that the assumed strong differences in
communication styles between the French and the German groups did not
became apparent in the study, if they existed.

Interpretation of Pictograms
For five of the 13 pictograms presented to the subjects, significant
differences in understanding and interpretation due to culture were found.
The observed differences were mostly caused by a significantly higher number
of incomplete or incorrect answers from the subjects in one group as
compared to the other three groups. For three of the five pictograms, the U.S.
group had significantly lower scores, resulting from very short answers or the
absence of any answer.
One interpretation of these findings can be the short and to-the-point
communication style of the English language. Short sentences and headlinetype statements are preferred in the U.S. Thus, when interpreting the
pictograms HEELS3, ELECTROl, and ELECTR02, short answers such as "No
radios" or "No shoes" were preferred by U.S. (and to a certain extent, British)
subjects. These answers were scored as incomplete but safe, since they did not
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clarify what was exactly meant by the symbols, without giving a wrong or
unsafe answer. Potential problems, however, could emerge for the
instructions to remove high-heel shoes, where differences between the U.S.
and the German group were observed. If all passengers take off their shoes
during an emergency, possible dangers are delays, obstruction of the aisles and
seat-rows with loose shoes, and the lack of protection of the passengers' feet
against debris. These hazards might outweight the advantages induced by the
removal of high-heel shoes for the usage of the exit slide. It was concluded
that the short U.S. interpretations could potentially have an impact on safety.
The same problem of answers that lacked precision was found for
SLIDEl. German answers were in exhaustive detail regarding the need to use
the slide as quickly as possible, but failed to mention the best way to do so
(jump). Here, the long and complicated German style which resulted in high
mean scores for other pictograms became counterproductive. Interestingly
enough, German subjects mentioned jumping considerably more often for
SLIDE2.
The interpretation of EXITl was the only case where a significant
difference was found due to a high number of wrong or unsafe answers from
one group. Many French subjects implied in their answers that the arrow
used in the picture was actually installed in the aircraft. This was incorrect.
The reason why many subjects in the French group gave this interpretation
remained unclear.
For several safety-related areas, such as the usage of exit slides or
removal of high-heel shoes, more than one pictogram was presented. It
became apparent from the test scores that most pictograms were correctly
interpreted by a large percentage of subjects. Some symbols, however, were
recognized and understood better than others. One of the symbols for the

removal of high-heel shoes, for example, led to confusion among many
passengers as to whether the symbol meant to take off or put on shoes. For
the symbols prohibiting the use of certain electronic equipment, the subjects'
answers showed a high proportion of literal interpretations: Only the
depicted equipment was mentioned. It was concluded that the degree of
subjects1 understanding varied according to the quality of the symbol.

Safety Card Design Preferences
The results regarding design preferences for safety cards did not show
the hypothesized differences between the German and the French groups
based on varying communication styles. German and French subjects chose
drawings and words at almost equal numbers. This indicated that the
preferences among French and Germans suggested by the literature for
advertisements were not significant for the preferred design of safety cards.
Drawings were a feature mentioned almost equally often by subjects
from all cultures. It was concluded that drawings are a method of conveying
safety information accepted by all cultures in the test.
U.S. subjects selected photos more often and with a higher priority
than European subjects. These differences, however, were significant
between the German and the U.S. group. It was concluded that photos were a
design feature appealing to U.S. subjects, while unimportant to Germans.

Color Coding of Exits in Floor Lighting
As was hypothesized, European subjects indicated significantly more
often than U.S. subjects that green was used as the color to denote an
emergency exit in aircraft floor lighting. Conversely, red was mentioned by
U.S. subjects significantly more often than by European subjects. The same

significant differences were found when the subjects were asked which color
should be preferred to indicate exits: U.S. subjects chose red, while European
subjects selected green. Only very few subjects from any culture mentioned
any color other than green or red. These findings corrobated with the current
color coding of exit signs in buildings. In the U.S., exit signs are red, while
green is used in wide parts of Europe. It was concluded that the answers
varied significantly due to the subjects' previous experiences.
The results of this part of the study are in agreement with general
principles of cross-cultural communication suggested by the reviewed
literature. Bertin (1983) stated that "the meaning of a symbol becomes
familiar to us only by habit; through the repetition of a similar situation"
(p. 95). In a specialized field such as the use of colors to denote exits, the
employed code must be learned to correctly interpret the symbol. If the code
varies from one culture to another, it must be expected that the interpretation
of the respective symbol differs according to culture.
The findings from the test suggest that a European passenger who is
caught in an aircraft accident might search for green lights in the floor path.
Based upon previous experience, the passenger might believe that green
indicates the exit, even when - on a U.S. plane - the exits are marked in red.
The passenger would probably not be able to identify the location of exits and
thus might perish in the wreckage. The reverse situation would be true of a
U.S. passenger aboard a plane that has an emergency floor path installed
which uses green as the color to denote an exit. It was therefore concluded
that the current status of employing varying colors in different countries to
denote emergency exits could result in potentially dangerous confusion
among the passengers as to how an exit is actually marked.

Summary
Significant differences due to culture could be observed between the
subjects for several of the investigated areas. This finding is important since
it gives empirical evidence to the hypothesis that the understanding of safetyrelated information can vary with culture. Once these differences are
investigated and documented, it will be possible to begin research into the
development of a safety information format that is equally effective for
subjects from different cultures.
Throughout the study, all possible precautions were taken to avoid
Type I errors, i.e., the statement that a significant difference due to culture
existed, when, in fact, there was none. It was felt by the researcher that this
procedure would add weight to the findings in those areas where significant
differences were observed. A very strict method for the analysis of data was
used. Direct pairwise Chi-Square tests would have probably shown significant
differences between more groups and for more questions. A highly stratified
control group was used to confirm the results found for all subjects. Thus,
the researcher took the risk to commit Type II errors, i.e., to state that there
was no significant difference when there was one. Still, significant cultureinduced differences were observed.
Furthermore, the differences were found between subjects from four
cultural areas which share a long history and many common concepts. All
subjects came from highly industrialized Western Democracies. All subjects
were university students. Yet, even between those subjects of the same age,
gender, and experience that studied in the same, test-related field, significant
differences were observed.
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Aircraft passenger safety briefing cards are an important part of safety
precautions in aviation. Previous experience has shown that the cards help
to save lives during aircraft accidents. Thus, they must be understood by all
readers, regardless of age, gender, previous experience, or culture. The results
of this study led to the conclusion that cultural differences must be taken into
account when designing aircraft passenger safety information.

Recommendations
General

Recommendations

The test showed significant differences due to culture in the
understanding and interpretation of certain passenger safety information.
These differences were found between subjects from Western Europe and the
U.S., relatively similar societies. It can only be assumed to what extent the
differences would grow in scale and severeness, if subjects from more distinct
cultures were selected. Therefore, one recommendation is to test safety cards
internationally among subjects from different cultural areas.

Recommendation

I

Test at least those safety briefing cards used on international flights for
their effectiveness among subjects from different cultures to determine
whether the cards are significantly less effective for particular cultures than
for others. Preferably, test in many different countries, but use at least subjects
from the countries of departure and arrival.

Recommendation

II

As one step towards more international testing, replicate this study
with subjects from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to determine whether
greater differences exist between cultures that do not share the same
geographical or historical background. Target populations could include
China, Japan, Argentina, or Kenya.

Since the differences between the cultures were observed using the
conceptual test method, it can only be assumed whether the subjects would
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act differently in an emergency according to their answers. Cross-cultural
differences might even be more pronounced when the subjects have to
perform the necessary tasks.

Recommendation

HI

In follow-up tests, use the behavioral test method to investigate the
influence of cross-cultural differences on the understanding and
interpretation of passenger safety information. Employ the conceptual test
method to identify symbols that have different meanings to subjects from
different cultures. Then, using these symbols, test whether the differences
found in the conceptual tests have a significant influence on subjects'
behavior.

Recommendations

for Test Procedures

During the analysis of the data, several shortcomings of the study due
to the selection of subjects became apparent. A broad approach was used to
test for as many different areas of interpretation of safety information as
possible. The subjects in the test varied according to four extraneous variables
which were unevenly distributed across the cultures. As a result, a highly
stratified group had to be used as a control group, introducing the chances of
committing Type II errors into the study. Therefore, the following measures
are recommended for follow-up studies.

Recommendation

IV

Use test groups that are either representative of the respective
population, or limit the number of extraneous variables as much as possible.
The second option, however, increases the chances for Type II errors.
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Recommendation

V

When using the same approach of using entire classes from
universities for the test, amend the test instructions so that only native
students should complete the test. All non-native subjects were removed
from the analysis which reduced the number of subjects in one group
(British, subgroup I, Cranfield) considerably.

Recommendation

VI

This study used a broad approach, testing in several areas of
interpretation and understanding of safety cards. For follow-up studies, test
only one area (e.g., high-heel shoes) at one time, but in more detail.

Recommendations

for Safety Card Design

According to the results of the extended tests, an international standard
for safety cards should be developed. Instructions that are effective for one
culture might be ineffective in another culture. Standardized instructions at
an optimum overall level could aid towards familiarity with the procedures
among all readers. They could also help people from different cultures in
understanding the information without the need for translation, alleviating
problems of confusion due to changing instructions.
Standardization also has the advantage of lower cost. An effective
safety card would be developed once, and only the details regarding a
particular airplane would change. This would save cost, and allow air carriers
from less wealthy countries to acquire effective safety briefing cards.
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Recommendation

VII

If indicated by the extended cross-cultural tests, develop an
international standard regarding safety cards. The standard should include
guidelines regarding the size, format, color, etc. of the cards. Furthermore,
details with respect to the way safety information is depicted should be given.

Some of the design feature questions indicated that drawings were
acceptable to and desired by most subjects in the test. In previous studies (e.g.,
Johnson, 1980), drawings were found to be more effective than photos, since
they reduced visual clutter and allowed emphasis of certain, important parts
of the picture. Some of the pictograms were recognized and interpreted more
correctly by all subjects than others.

Recommendation

VIII

As a first step towards standardization, make the use of drawings to
convey safety information mandatory. Then, select those symbols and
pictograms that showed a high level of recognition among subjects from all
cultures and standardize them.

Recommendations

Regarding Specific

Pictograms

The symbols used to convey the instruction to remove high heel shoes
were recognized at varying degrees. HEELS3 was particularly confusing to
some subjects who did not know whether the symbol meant to remove or to
wear shoes.

Ill

Recommendation

IX

Amend the symbol HEELS3 with an arrow showing the direction of
movement away from the foot.

The subjects' interpretation of the symbols showing the prohibition to
use electronic equipment aboard the airplane was very literal. The subjects
mentioned only the type of equipment actually depicted on the cards.

Recommendation

X

Amend the pictograms depicting the prohibition to operate certain
electronic equipment as to which equipment shall not be used. Consider
removal of the symbol from the safety card, since this instruction is not
directly related to the safety procedures for the case of an aircraft accident.
Consider combining this information with others such as no smoking on a
separate instruction sheet which the passengers could receive with their ticket
or boarding pass.

Recommendations

Regarding Exit Path Lighting

Several of the questions in this study were connected to emergency exit
floor path lighting. Three pictograms (EXITl, SMOKELIG, and FLOORLIG)
showed different depictions of the guidance system. Two questions centered
around the color-coding of exits in the floor lighting.
The findings of this study with respect to the color-coding of exits are
important to aircraft passenger safety. The location of emergency exits is a
critical step in survival after aircraft accidents. Previous aircraft accidents
showed that people died because they were not able to find the exit in a
smoke-filled cabin. Two passengers were killed in 1983 during the post-
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accident fire of a twin-jet at the Greater Cincinnati International Airport
because they could not locate the overwing emergency exit (NTSB, 1986). The
survivors of this accident indicated that they had severe difficulties to find
the exit. This airplane had no emergency floor lighting, and the only hints
that the survivors used to locate the exit were a dim glow of light or a draft of
air. As a result of this accident, the emergency floor path marking was
introduced in the U.S.
In 1991, the researcher had the opportunity to participate in evacuation
trials from the cabin safety simulator at the Civil Aeromedical Institute
(CAMI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Even without any heat or toxic fumes
present from a fire, with the emergency floor path installed, and with the
researcher being informed about the path, it was difficult to locate the exit in a
cabin filled with non-toxic smoke. If the confusion in a real emergency
evacuation, the heat, smoke, and toxic fumes from a real fire are added to the
situation, the location of the exit could become a very demanding task for the
average passenger, even without the added confusion as to whether the exit
floor path is colored red or green.
It has been suggested by the literature that there are symbols that are
more universally accepted than others, either because they are intuitively
obvious to the observer, or because a certain familiarity has been built across
cultures (Bertin, 1983). One example is the use of colors in traffic signals.
Across the world, red means "Stop" in traffic lights, while green means "Go."
It can be assumed that the majority of aircraft passengers is exposed to this
color code on a daily basis. As has been stated earlier, humans tend to revert
to old habits and learned behavior when confronted with a high-stress
situation. Thus, passengers who did not previously learn which color was
used to mark an exit would probably transfer their experiences from surface
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travel to aviation. They would think that a green light indicated a clear path
to proceed across the lights and towards the exit. Conversely, confronted with
red lights, they might conclude that they should not cross the signal because
greater danger was behind it.
The respective U.S. regulation for floor proximity emergency escape
path marking can be found in FAR 25.812 (e) (DoT, 1992). While the colors
for emergency exit signs are stipulated as red letters on white surface, no
specifications as to color are made for the identification of the exits in the
floor path. Therefore, any color could be chosen without changing the
regulations. Since the researcher believes that it would add to safety to
standardize the exit coding, preferably to the more intuitive green, the
following recommendations were made.

Recommendation XI
As long as there is no standard as to which color is used, emphasize the
color used in a particular aircraft in all passenger information. Amend safety
briefing cards, crewmember briefings, and videotape instructions, if necessary,
to point out which color denotes an exit.

Recommendation XII
Develop an international standard for the use of colors in denoting
exits. Test green for its effectiveness; if effective with respect to legibility,
contrast, acceptance, etc., implement green in all aircraft.

Recommendation XIII
Color coding would not be necessary if the path itself showed the exits
by turning towards it, similar to the arrow presumed to be installed by some
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subjects in the French group. Install a guidance path which leads directly to
the exit, and color coding is no longer important.
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APPENDIX A
FAR PART 121.571 AND FAR PART 121.585 (d) AND (e)
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§121.571 Briefing passengers before take off.
(a) Each certificate holder operating
a passenger-carrying airplane shall
insure that all passengers are orally
briefed by the appropriate crewmember as follows:
(1) Before each takeoff, on each of
the following:
(i) Smoking. Each passenger shall be
briefed on when, where, and under
what conditions smoking is prohibited
(including, but not limited to, the pertinent requirements of Part 252 of this
title). This briefing shall include a
statement that the Federal Aviation
Regulations require passenger compliance with the lighted passenger information signs and posted placards. The
briefing shall also include a statement
that Federal law prohibits tampering
with, disabling, or destroying any
smoke detector in an airplane lavatory.
(ii) The location of emergency exits.
(hi) The use of safety belts including
instructions on how to fasten and unfasten the safety belt.
(iv) The location and use of any required emergency flotation means.
(2) After each takeoff, immediately
before or immediately after turning
the seat belt sign off, an announcement shall be made that passengers
should keep their seat belts fastened,
while seated, even when the seat belt
sign is off.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph
(a)(4) of this section, before each takeoff a flight attendant assigned to the
flight shall conduct an individual
briefing of each person who may need
the assistance of another person to
move expeditiously to an exit in the
event of an emergency. In the briefing
the flight attendant shall—
(i) Brief the person and his attendant. if any, on the routes to each ap-

Note. From Code of Federal Regulations,
Government Printing Office.

propriate exit and on the most appropriate time to begin moving to an exit
in the event of an emergency; and
(ii) Inquire of the person and his attendant, if any, as to the most appropriate manner of assisting the person
so as to prevent pain and further
injury.
(4) The requirements of paragraph
(a)(3) of this section do not apply to a
person who has been given a briefing
before a previous leg of a flight in the
same aircraft when the flight attendants on duty have been advised as to
the most appropriate manner of assisting the person so as to prevent pain
and further injury.
(b) Each certificate holder shall
carry on each passenger-carrying airplane, in convenient locations for use
of each passenger, printed cards supplementing the oral briefing and containing—
(1) Diagrams of, and methods of operating, the emergency exits; and
(2) Other instructions necessary for
use of emergency equipment.
Each card required by this paragraph
must contain information that is pertinent only to the type and model airplane used for that flight.
(c) The certificate holder shall describe in its manual the procedure to
be followed in the briefing required by
paragraph (a) of this section.
[Amdt. 121-2, 30 FR 3206, Mar. 9, 1965, as
amended by Amdt. 121-30, 32 FR 13268,
Sept. 20, 1967; Amdt. 121-84, 37 FR 3975,
Feb. 24. 1972; Amdt. 121-133, 42 FR 18394,
Apr. 7, 1977; Amdt. 121-144, 43 FR 22648,
May 25, 1978; Amdt. 121-146, 43 FR 28403,
June 29, 1978; Amdt. 121-196, 53 FR 12362,
Apr. 13, 1988]

Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S.
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§ 1 2 1 . 5 8 5 Exit row seating.
(d) Each certificate holder shall include
on passenger information cards, presented
in the languages used by the certificate
holder for passenger information cards,
at each seat affected by this section. Information that. In the event of an emergency In which a crew member is not
available to assist, a passenger occupying
an exit row seat may use if called upon to
perform the following functions:
(1) Locate the emergency exit;
(2) Recognize the emergency exit openng mechanism;
(3) Comprehend the instructions for
Dperattng the emergency exit;
(4) Operate the emergency exit;
(5) Assess whether opening the emergency exit will Increase the hazards to
which passengers may be exposed;
(6) Follow oral directions and hand
signals given by a crewmember;
(7) Stow or secure the emergency exit
door so that it will not impede use of the
exit;
(8) Assess the condition of an escape

slide, activate the slide, and stabilize the
slide after deployment to assist others In
getting off the slide;
(9) Pass expeditiously through the
emergency exit; and
(lOj Assess, select, and follow a safe
path away from the emergency exit.
(e) Each certificate holder shall include
on passenger information cards, presented
In the languages used by the certificate
holder for passenger Information cards,
at all seats affected by this section, the
selection criteria set forth in paragraph (b)
of this section, and a request that a passenger Identify himself or herself to allow
reseating if he or she:
(1) Cannot meet the selection criteria
set forth In paragraph (b) of this section;
(2) Has a nondiscernible condition that
will prevent him or her from performing
the applicable functions listed in paragraph (d) of this section;
(3) May suffer bodily harm as the result
of performing one or more of those functions; or,
(4) Does not wish to perform those
functions.

Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
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APPENDIX B
FAR PART 135.117 AND FAR PART 135.129 (d) AND (e)

§135.117 Briefing of passengers before flight.
(a) Before each takeoff each pilot in
command of an aircraft carrying passengers shall ensure that all passengers have been orally briefed on—
(1) Smoking. Each passenger shall
be briefed on when, where, and under
what conditions smoking is prohibited
(including, but not limited to, the pertinent requirements"^ part 252 of this
title). This briefing ^shall include a
statement that the Federal Aviation
Regulations require passenger compliance with the lighted passenger information signs (if such signs are required) and posted placards. The briefing shall also include a statement (if
the aircraft is equipped with a lavatory) that Federal law prohibits tampering with, disabling, or destroying any
smoke detector installed in an aircraft
lavatory.
(2) Use of seat belts;
(3) The placement of seat backs in
an upright position before takeoff and
landing;
(4) Location and means for opening
^e passenger entry door and emergency exits;
(5) Location of survival equipment;
.J(6) If the flight involves extended
qyerwater operation, ditching procedures and the use of required flotation
equipment;
(7) If the flight involves operations
above 12,000 feet MSL, the normal
and emergency use of oxygen; and
(8) Location and operation of fire extinguishers.
(b) Before each takeoff the pilot in
command shall ensure that each
person who may need the assistance of

another person to move expeditiously
to an exit if an emergency occurs and
that person's attendant, if any, has received a briefing as to the procedures
to be followed if an evacuation occurs.
This paragraph does not apply to a
person who has been given a briefing
before a previous leg of a flight in the
same aircraft.
(c) The oral briefing required by
paragraph (a) of this section shall be
given by the pilot in command or a
crewmember.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions
of paragraph (c) of this section, for
aircraft certificated to carry 19 passengers or less, the oral briefing required
by paragraph (a) of this section shall
be given by the pilot in command, a
crewmember, or other qualified person
designated by the certificate holder
and approved by the Administrator.
(e) The oral briefing required by
paragraph (a) shall be supplemented
by printed cards which must be carried in the aircraft in locations convenient for the use of each passenger.
The cards must—
(1) Be appropriate for the aircraft
on which they are to be used;
(2) Contain a diagram of, and
method of operating, the emergency
exits; and
(3) Contain other instructions necessary for the use of emergency equipment on board the aircraft.
(O The briefing required by paragraph (a) may be delivered by means
of an approved recording playback
device that is audible to each passenger under normal noise levels.
tt>oc. No. 16097. 43 FR 46783, Oct. 10, 1978.
** amended by Amdt. 135-9, 51 FR 40709,

Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office,

§ 135.129

Exit row seating.

(d) Each certificate holder shall include on passenger information cards,
presented in the languages used by
the certificate holder for passenger information cards, at each seat affected
by this section, information that, in
the event of an emergency in which a
crewmember is not available to assist,
a passenger occupying an exit row seat
may be called upon to perform the following functions:
(1) Locate the emergency exit;
(2) Recognize the emergency exit
opening mechanism;
(3) Comprehend the instructions for
operating the emergency exit;
(4) Operate the emergency exit;
(5) Assess whether opening the
emergency exit will increase the hazards to which passengers may be exposed;
(6) Follow oral directions and hand
signals given by a crewmember;
(7) Stow or secure the emergency
exit door so that it will not impede use
of the exit;
(8) Assess the condition of an escape
slide, activate the slide, and stabilize

the slide after deployment to assist
others in getting off the slide;
(9) Pass expeditiously through the
emergency exit; and
(10) Assess, select, and follow a safe
path away from the emergency exit.
(e) Each certificate holder shall include on passenger information cards,
presented in the languages used by
the certificate holder for passenger information cards, at all seats affected
by this section, the selection criteria
set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, and a request that a passenger
identify himself or herself to allow reseating if her or she:
(1) Cannot meet the selection criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of this
section;
(2) Has a nondiscernible condition
that will prevent him or her from performing the applicable functions listed
in paragraph (d) of this section;
(3) May suffer bodily harm as the
result of performing one or more of
those functions; or,
(4) Does not wish to perform those
functions.

Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
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APPENDIX C
SAFETY CARD SAMPLE - DATA

I

Airline

| Euroberlin Prance
I
Hapag-Lloyd
1
Hapag-Lloyd
LTU
|
Lufthansa
|
Lufthansa
|
Lufthansa
|
Lufthansa
|
Lufthansa
|
Lufthansa
1
Lufthansa
|
Lufthansa
1
Cathay Pacific
|
Icelandair
| Garoda Indonesia
|
Luxair
KLM
|
Air Portugal
1 Singapore Airlines
1 Singapore Airlines
|
Swissair
|
Swissair
|
British Airways
Air Berlin USA
|
American
|
American
1
Continental
Continental
|
Continental
Conlinental
Continental
I
Continental
Conlincnlal
|
Delta
•
Delia
Delta
Delta
Delta
Delta
Delta
Delta
Delta
Delta
|

1 Aircraft Type 1
11737
A310-300
A3W-300
MD-11
A300
A300
A310
A320
B737
B747
B747
DC-10
B747-300
B757-200
A300 B4-220
B737-100
B747
B737-200
A310
B747-400
B747
F100
B747-400
B737-300
B727-223
Super 80
A300
B727-100
B727-200
B737-200/300
DC-9-30
DC-9-80
DC-9-80
A310-200/300
B727-2O0
B737-200/300
B7S7
B767-300
B767-300ER
DC-9-32
L-10U
MD-11

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

1

Country

France
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Hong Kong
Iceland
Indonesia I
Luxemburg
Netherlands
Portugal
Singapore
Singapore
Switzerland
Switzerland
U.K.
U.S A.
U.S A.
USA
USA
US.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S A.
US.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
U.S.A.

MD-88 1

U.S.A.

1

Year
1988
N/A
N/A
N/A
1989
1990
1989
N/A
1989
1990
1989
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1985
1983
N/A
N/A
1990
1990
N/A
N/A
N/A
1987
1990
1988
1990
1987
1989
1987
1990
1991
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1991

1990

1

Diagrams 1 Diagrams 1 Words Sc 1 Words 1 Photos 1 Color I Multiple 1 Translated 1
1 Languages 1 Instructions 1
& (Words \ (Diagrams)
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1 l
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
o
0
1
1
0
o
o 1 o
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
o
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 1
o
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
|

o

1

o

1

o 1 o 1

Over-wingI Shoes 1
Exit Door
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
3
0
3
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
4
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
3
3
3
3
3
3
0

o3

2

1|

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2 1

(Continued on Next Page)

Note. Explanation of Coding:

•
•
•
•

Year
Design Features:
Over-wing Exit Door
Shoes:

N/A: Unknown
0: Not Used
0: Not Mentioned
0: Nol Menlioned

1: Used on Card
1: On Seats in Front 2: Outside
3: On Seats in Exit Row
1: Remove All Shoes 2: Remove High-Heels Shoes

4: On Scats Behind

(Continued from Previous Page)

1

Airline

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

Eastern
Eastern
Eastern
Eastern
Northwest
Northwest
Northwest
Northwest

1

Pan Am

|
|
|

Pan Am
Pan Am
Southwest
TWA
TWA
TWA
TWA
TWA
TWA
TWA
TWA
TWA
TWA

1

TWA
U S Air

1

US Air
United
United
United
United

|

1 Aircraft Type |

Country

B727-200
DC-^-31
DC-9-32
DC-9-51
B727-100
B727-200
B727-200
1 DC-9-30/50
A310
11727
!
11727
11737
B727-231
B727-31
B747
B767
B767
1X1-9-80
DC-9 80
DC-9-80
L-1011
L-1011
L-1011-100
B737-200/300
F100
B727 Wretch
B727-200
B737

USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA

DC-10

Note. Explanation of Coding*

!

1

USA

•
•
•
•

1

1

J

Year

1 Diagrams 1 Diagrams 1 Words & I Words 1
& (Words) 1 (Diagrams)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
o
u
I
°
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
j
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
|
0

1990
1990
1990
1990
N/A
1989
1991
N/A
1990
1990
N/A
1990
1981
19S1
1988
1991
1988
198S
1990
1991
1987
1991
198/
1990
1990
1988
1991
19S1

198f,

Yean
Design Features
Over-wing Exit Door
Shoes

1

o

1

u

1

o

1

N/A Unknown
0 Nol Used
0 Nol Menlioned
0 Nol Menlioned

o
o

1
1 o 1

Photos 1 Color 1 Multiple 1 Translated 1 Over-wing 1 Shoe*
j Languages | Instructions | Exit Door
2
1
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
1
3
1
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1 1
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
1
0
2
3
1
1
1
3
2
o
0
0
4
2
o
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
1
0
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
3
0
0
1
1
3
0
1
1
1
3
0

1 1

1

1

1

1

0

1 Used on Card
1 On Seals in Tronl 2 Outside
3 On Seals in Exit Row
1 Remove All Shoes 2 Remove High-Heels Shoes

1 o 1

4* On Seals Behind
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APPENDIX D
ENGLISH TEST/QUESTIONNAIRE
(SIZE REDUCED TO 85% OF ORIGINAL)

A v / i a t i o n
Thank you f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g
The d a t a d e r i v e d
safety

from t h i s

S a f e t y

in t h i s aviation
study w i l l

T e s t
safety

help to develop

e q u i p m e n t and p r o c e d u r e s aboard c o m m e r c i a l

P l e a s e understand t h a t your answers w i l l
confidence.

No i n d i v i d u a l

data w i l l

P l e a s e do n o t s i g n y o u r name on t h i s

test.

be

be h e l d

improved

aircraft.
in

strictest

released.

questionnaire.

PLEASE READ EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY, AND ANSWER SUCH WHICH BEST
REPRESENTS YOU AND YOUR OPINIONS.
PASSENGER SAFETY INFORMATION BRIEFING CARDS ARE INTENDED TO GIVE AIRCRAFT
PASSENGERS GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE EMERGENCIES.

THE CARDS

ARE REQUIRED BY LAW IN MOST COUNTRIES. THE CARDS CAN USUALLY BE FOUND IN THE
SEAT POCKET IN FRONT OF EACH PASSENGER.

1 a) Have you ever flown on a commercial
a i r c r a f t / on an airliner ?

yes

no

IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED 1 a) UITH "NO", PLEASE SKIP THE FOLLDUING QUESTIONS AND
PROCEED DIRECTLY TO QUESTION 2.
1 b) How o f t e n do you usually f l y on a commercial

about once or twice

a i r c r a f t per year ?

several times
about each month

1 c) Uhen did you f l y last as a passenger on a
commercial a i r c r a f t ?

iess

tnan

less t n a n

a month
a ygar

ago

ago

more than a year ago
1 d) On your latest f l i g h t , did you read the passenger

yes

safety information briefing card ?

1 e) I f you did not read the s a f e t y card on your l a t e s t
f l i g h t , why ?

| < n e w i t s contents
did not want t o
could not f i n d i t

no

QUESTION 2:

If you were asked t o design a passenger safety information briefing card.
which three features would you put the most emphasis on ?
Using the numbers 1, 2. and 3. with 1 indicating the most important item, please
select the t h r e e f e a t u r e s t h a t would be most important t o you.
a) Drawings
b) Photographs
c) Durability of the card
d) Use of d i f f e r e n t languages
e) Multi-colored
f) Size of the card
g) Uords/Uriting

QUESTION 3:

On this and the following pages, you will find graphics which are similar to those
used on actual passenger safety information briefing cards.
For each of the symbols presented, please describe in a few words what you think
they represent most likely.
Example:

131

133

ly^Hllljj^

QUESTION U
Let us assume you had t o open an emergency e x i t
during an a i r c r a f t evacuation, as indicated to the
right.
UHERE UOULD YOU LEAVE THE DOOR ONCE REMOVED
FROM THE FRAME ?
UOULD YOU PUT IT:

a) on t h e seat in f r o n t of you, as in illustration

A

b) throw i t outside the plane, as in illustration

B

c) on the seats in your row, as in i l l u s t r a t i o n

C

d) on the seats in the row behind you, as in illustration

D

Tx~n

nrm

QUESTION 5:
Lights on the floor along the aisle provide guidance t o exits.
5 a) Uhat color most likely indicates an exit ?
white

yellow

red

green

blue _

5 b) In your opinion, what color should be used to mark an exit ?
white

yellow

red

green

blue _

QUESTION 6:

6 a)

You are

6 b) Your age is

female

male

under 30

30 to 60

over 60

6 c) Your native language is
6 d) Your home country is
6 e) You are now studying in (country)
6 f) Your major is

_____
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APPENDIX E
TEST/QUESTIONNAIRE: FRENCH VERSION
(SIZE REDUCED TO 85% OF ORIGINAL)

137

T e s t

iTQlati-F

^

l a

s f e c _ji"it:£>

a e r i e n n e

Merci de b i e n v o u l o i r p a r t i c i p e r _ c e t t e
but d ' a m e l i o r e r

les

publiee
S'il

Celle-gi

p r o c e d u r e s e t panneaux de s e c u r i t e

a v i o n s de t r a n s p o r t p a s s a g e r .
seront u t i l i s e e s

enquete.

p a s s a g e r

Veuillez

e t r e a s s u r e que v o s

de m a n i e r e c o n f i d e n t i e l l e .

a pour

a bord

des

reponses

Aucune donn6e n e

sera

individuellement.

vous p l a i t

ne s i g n e z p a s c e

questionnaire.

VEUILLEZ LIRE ATTENTIVEMENT CE QUESTIONNAIRE, ET REPONDRE DE TELLE
MANIERE A CE QUE VOS REPONSES REFLETENT LE PLUS PRECISEMENT VOTRE
OPINION.
LES CARTES DE SECURITE DANS LES AVIONS ONT POUR BUT DE FOURNIR AUX PASSAGERS
DIRECTIONS ET INFORMATIONS DANS L'EVENTUALITE D'UNE URGENCE. LA LEGISLATION
DANS PLUSIEURS PAYS EXIGE QUE CES CARTES DE SECURITE 50IENT A BORD AVANT CHAQUE
VOL.

CELLE-CI SONT NORMALLEMENT SITUEES DANS LA POCHE AU DOS DE

CHAQUE SIEGE.
1 a) Avez-vous deja voyag6 dans un avion
de t r a n s p o r t passager ?

oui

non

EN CAS DE REPONSE NEGATIVE A CETTE QUESTION, PASSEZ DIRECTEMENT A LA
QUESTION NO. 2.
1 b) Prenez-vous souvent l'avion ?

une ou deux fois par an
plusieures fois par an
a peu pres tous les mois

1 c) Quand e s t - c e que vous avez pris
l'avion pour la derniere fois ?

11 y a moins d'un mois
II y a moins d'un an
II y a plus d'un an

1 d) Lors de v o t r e dernier voyage en avion,
avez-vous iu la c a r t e de s_curit§ passager?
1 e) Si vous n'avez pas lu la c a r t e de

oui

non

j ' e n connaissais le contenu

s_curit_ passager lors de v o t r e dernier

j e n'en avais pas envie

vol, dites pourquoi.

j e ne Tai pas trouvGe
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QUESTION NO. 2:
Si l'on vous demandait de concevoir une carte de s6curit§ passager, sur quelles
t r o i s caract_ristiques mettriez-vous le plus l'accent ?
Veuillez indiquer les t r o i s plus importantes caract§ristiques par 1, 2 et 3
(1 repr§sentant la plus importante).
a)

Dessins/Symbol/Graphique

b)

Photos

c)

Durability de la c a r t e

d)

Diff6rentes langues

e)

Differentes couleurs

f)

Dimensions de la c a r t e

g)

Mots/R§daction

QUESTION NO. 3:
Sur c e t t e page et les suivantes, vous trouverez des graphiques similaires a ceux
que l'on peut t r o u v e r sur rie reelles cartes de security passager.
Pour chacun des symbols suivants, veuillez decrire, en quelque mots, quelle est,
pour vous, leur signification.

Example:

ln^rdicUon de funngr le cigar o u

la pip^-
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iv\ |j ~ 8 B _ J I _ I ^ I

oJK_

L_i_ )r

QUESTION NO. U:

Imaginons que vous deviez ouvrir une issue de
secours sur le cot§ d r o i t
lors de l'§vacuation d'un avion,

QU'ALLEZ VOUS FAIRE DE LA PORTE ?

ALLEZ-VOUS LA

a)

mettre sur le si£ge devant vous, comme indiqu§ par la figure

A

b)

j e t e r a l'exterieure, comme indique par la figure

B

c)

mettre sur le si&ge a c6t§ de vous, comme indique par la figure

C

d)

mettre sur le si£ge derri&re vous, comme indiquG par la figure

D
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QUESTION NO. 5:

Le "sentier" lumineux le long des allees a pour but d'indiquer les issues de secours.
5 a) Quelle est la couleur qui vraissemblablement indique une issue de secours ?
blanc

jaune

rouge

vert

bleu

5 b) A v o t r e avis, quelle couleur devrait e t r e utilisee pour indiquer une issue de secours ?
blanc

jaune

rouge

vert

bleu

QUESTION NO. 6:

6 a) sexe
6 b) age

feminin
moins de 30 ans

masculin
de 30 a 60 ans

6 c) Quelle est v o t r e langue maternelle
6 d) Quel est v o t r e pays d'origine
6 e) Dans quel pays effectuez-vous vos etudes
6 f) Dans quelle speciality

plus de 60 ans
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APPENDIX F
TEST/QUESTIONNAIRE: GERMAN VERSION
(SIZE REDUCED TO 85% OF ORIGINAL)

Lu-Pt-Patnr-tL

S i c h e r h e i t s - T e s t

Vielen Dank fUr Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Luftfahrt SicherheitsTest. Die Daten von dieser Studie werden dazu beitragen, neue
und verbesserte Sicherheitsausrilstungen und -prozeduren filr
Passagierflugzeuge zu entwickeln.
Ihre Antworten werden streng vertraulich behandelt. Keine
individuellen Daten werden veroffentlicht.
Bitte schreiben Sie nicht Ihren Namen auf diesen Fragebogen.
BITTE LESEN SIE ALLE FRAGEN AUFMERKSAM UND ANTWORTEN SO, DASS
IHRE MEINUNGEN AM BESTEN WIEDERGEGEBEN WERDEN.
SICHERHEITSKARTEN FUR FLUGPASSAGIERE SIND DAZU GEDACHT, RICHTLINIEN UND
INFORMATIONEN FUR EVENTUELLE NOTFALLE ZU GEBEN. IN DEN MEISTEN LANDERN
SIND SIE PER GESETZ VORGESCHRIEBEN.

DIE KARTEN BEFINDEN SICH NORMALERUEISE

IN DEN SITZTASCHEN VOR JEDEM PASSAGIER.

1 a) Sind Sie jemals als Passagier in einem
Verkehrsflugzeug geflogen ?

ja

nein

UENN SIE FRAGE 1 a) MIT "NEIN" BEANTWORTET HABEN, UBERSPRINGEN SIE BITTE DIE
FOLGENDEN FRAGEN UND GEHEN SIE DIREKT ZU FRAGE 2 UBER.
1 b) Uie o f t fliegen Sie normalerweise pro Jahr
als Passagier in Verkehrsflugzeugen ?

circa ein- bis zweimal
mehrmals
etwa jeden Monat

1 c) Uann sind Sie das l e t z t e Mai als Passagier in
einem Verkehrsflugzeug geflogen ?

vor weniger als einem Monat
vor weniger als einem Jahr
vor mehr als einem Jahr

1 d) Uahrend Ihres l e t z t e n Fluges, haben Sie die
Sicherheitskarte f u r Flugpassagiere gelesen ?
1 e) Falls Sie die Sicherheitskarte wahrend lhres
l e t z t e n Fluges nicht gelesen haben, warum ?

ja

nein

kannte den Inhalt
wollte nicht
konnte Karte n i c h t finden

FRAGE 2:
Uenn Sie gebeten wurden, eine Sicherheits-lnformations-Karte f u r Flugpassagiere zu
entwerfen, welche drei Charakteristika wurden Sie f u r besonders wichtig halten ?
B i t t e markieren Sie die drei wichtigsten Eigenschaften mit den Z i f f e r n 1, 2 und 3,
wobei 1 das wichtigste

Charakteristikum angibt.

a) Zeichnungen/Piktogramme
b) Photos
c) Haltbarkeit/Langlebigkeit der Karte
d) Benutzung mehrerer Sprachen
e) Mehrfarbig
f ) GroBe der Karte
g) Worte/Schrift

FRAGE 3:

Auf dieser und den folgenden Seiten finden Sie Symbole, die solchen auf heutigen
Sicherheitskarten f u r Flugpassagiere ahneln.
Fur jedes der abgebildeten Symbole, beschreiben Sie b i t t e in wenigen LJorten, was
nach Ihrer Meinung die wahrscheinlichste

Bedeutung der Zeichnungen ist.

Beispiel:

Das

t<ciuchcn von 'Z.iopyrem u n c i
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n-

2&?1P
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FRAGE 4 :

Angenommen, Sie mGBten wahrend einer
Flugzeug-Evakuierung einen Notausgang offnen,
so wie rechts dargestellt.

UIO WURDEN SIE DIE TUR DES NOTAUSGANGS LASSEN,
NACHDEM SIE SIE AUS DEM RAHMEN GEHOBEN HABEN ?

a) auf die Sitze vor Ihnen, so wie in Abbildung

A

b) aus dem Flugzeug, so wie in Abbildung

B

c) auf die Sitze in Ihrer Sitzreihe, so wie in Abbildung

C

d) auf die Sitze der Reihe hinter Ihnen, wie in Abbildung

D

r

£TiT,

FRAGE 5:
Leuchten am Boden im Mittelgang fuhren zu den Notausgangen.
5 a) Uielche Farbe zeigt am wahrscheinlichsten einen Notausgang an ?
weiB

gelb

rot

grun

blau

5 b) Nach Ihrer Meinung, welche Farbe sollte benutzt werden, um einen
Ausgang zu markieren ?
weiB

gelb

rot

grun

blau

FRAGE 6:

6 a) Sie sind
6 b) Sie sind

weiblich
unter 30

mannhch
30 bis 60

6 c) ihre Muttersprache ist
6 d) lhr Heimatland ist
6 e) Sie studieren zur Zeit in (Land)
6 f) lhr Studienfach ist

uber 60

Jahre a l t
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APPENDIX G
FAR PART 91.21

153

§ 91.21 Portable electronic devices.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section, no person may operate, nor may any operator or pilot in
command of an aircraft allow the operation of, any portable electronic
device on any of the following U.S.registered civil aircraft:
(1) Aircraft operated by a holder of
an air carrier operating certificate or
an operating certificate; or
(2) Any other aircraft while it is operated under IFR.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section
does not apply to—
(1) Portable voice recorders;
(2) Hearing aids;
(3) Heart pacemakers;
(4) Electric shavers; or
(5) Any other portable electronic
device that the operator of the aircraft has determined will not cause interference with the navigation or communication system of the aircraft on
which it is to be used.
(c) In the case of an aircraft operated by a holder of an air carrier operating certificate or an operating certificate, the determination required by
paragraph (b)(5) of this section shall
be made by that operator of the aircraft on which the particular device is
to be used. In the case of other aircraft, the determination may be made
by the pilot in command or other operator of the aircraft.

Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.

154

APPENDIX H
PICTOGRAMS AND THEIR SOURCES

Pictogram 1 (EXITl):
U.S. AirB-737-200/300

Pictogram 2 (SLIDEl):
Continental DC-9-30
Continental DC-9-80
Continental B737-200/300
Continental B727-100/200

Pictogram 3 (HEELSl):
Euroberlin France B737
Cathay Pacific B747-300

Pictogram 4 (OXYGEN):
United Airlines B-727-200 (new

Pictogram 5 (ELECTROl):
PAN AM B727
PAN AM A310

Pictogram 6 (HEELS2):
LUXAIR B737-200

Pictogram 7 (SMOKELIG):
Lufthansa (all cards)
Hapag-LJoyd A310
LTU MD-11

Pictogram 8 (SLIDE2):
United Airlines B727-200
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Pictogram 9 (DITCH);
Lufthansa (all cards)
Eastern Airlines B727-200
.-J

Eastern Airlines DC-9-31 /51

Pictogram 10 (HEELS3)
Garuda Indonesia A300

Pictogram 11 (FLOORLIG):
Continental Airlines (all cards)
T

t f tMa^H

Singapore Airlines A310/B747-400

Pictogram 12 (ELECTR02):
Continental Airlines (numerous
cards)

Pictogram 13 (BUTANE):
U.S. Air B737-200/300
U.S. Air F100
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APPENDIX I
TEST INSTRUCTIONS IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN
(SIZE REDUCED TO 85% OF ORIGINAL)

Instructions

for

Test: Super- v i sor»s

Thank you for allocating your time to participate in this study.
Instructions:
1. Please hand out the test to the students. Please assure that every
student receives his/her own copy.
2. Please read the following instructions to the students:
This test is part of a study for a Master's Thesis in aviation.
The test
in front of you is given to students in several countries worldwide.
Thank you for your participation
and cooperation.
Your answers to the test will be anonymous. Therefore, please do not sign
your name anywhere on the test.
You have 15 minutes to complete the test which should be ample. I will
inform you after 10 minutes that 5 minutes are left to finish the test.
Please read each question carefully,
and answer in such a way which best
represents you and your opinions.
Please give professional answers in
order to make this study a success. Please answer the test in (your
country's language, here: English). Thank you, please start now.
3. Start the time.
4. After 10 minutes, please read the following statement:
10 minutes are up, you have 5 more minutes to complete the test.
Please
try to answer all questions.
Please make sure that you answer question 6.
5. When 15 minutes from start have passed, please read the following:
15 minutes are up, please stop answering. Turn to the last page of the
test and make sure that you have answered question 6. If you have not yet
answered question 6, please do so now.
6. Please collect all answer sheets.
Put the tests in and seal the enclosed return envelope.
7. Send the tests to the following address (as on the return envelopes):
Dr. John Wise / Florian Jentsch
Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research (CAAR)
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114
U.S.A.
Please use air mail and indicate "documents" on the letter for customs
purposes.
Again, thank you very much for your help.
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In^trMCtipp

POUT

le

sur-vei 1 l a n t

Merci de prendre le temps de participer a cette etude.
Instructions:
1. Veuillez distribuer le test. Assurez-vouz que chaque etudiant recoive un
exemplaire.
2. Veuillez lire les instructions suivantes aux etudiants:
Ce test rentre dans le cadre d'une these de Master en aviation. Le
questionnaire que vous avez devant vous a ete traduit en differente
langues et va etre complete par des etudiants de differents pays.
Merci pour votre participation.
Les reponses a ce test sont anonymes. Vous etes done pri6s de ne pas
mentionner votre non.
Vous avez 15 minutes pour completer ce questionnaire, ce qui devrait
etre amplement suffisant.
Je vous avertirai quand il ne restera plus que
5 minutes. Veuillez lire attentivement chaque question, et repondre de
telle maniere a ce que vos reponses refletent le plus precisement votre
opinion. Soyez le plus professionel que possible afin d' assurer le succes
de cette etude. Repondez a ce test en frangais.
Merci. Vous pouvez commencer maintenant.
3. Commencer le chronometrage.
4. Apres 10 minutes, veuillez lire aux etudiants ce qui suit:
II vous reste 5 minutes. Essayer de repondre a toutes les questions.
Assurez-vous que vous avez repondu a 7a question no. 6.
5. Une fois les 15 minutes ecoulees veuillez lire ce qui suit:
Les 15 minutes sont passees, veuillez arreter d'ecrire.
Verifiez que vous
avez bien repondu a la question no. 6 a la derniere page du questionnaire.
Si vous n'avez pas complete cette question, veuillez le faire maintenant.
6. Veuillez rammasser les questionnaires.
Veuillez mettre les tests dans l'enveloppe et la fermer.
7. Veuillez envoyer cette enveloppe a l'adresse suivante:
Dr. John Wise / Florian Jentsch
Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research (CAAR)
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114
U.S.A.
Assurez-vous que ce courrier est envoys "par avion" et indiquez "documents"
sur l'enveloppe pour faciliter le passage de la douane.
Une fois encore, mes sincferes remerciements pour votre aide.

Instruktionen

-Fur- den Test:

Vielen Dank fur die Zeit und Muhe, die Sie diesem Projekt widmen.
Instruktionen:
1. Bitte verteilen Sie den Test an die Studenten. Bitte stellen Sie sicher,
daB jeder Student/jede Studentin je eigene Fragebogen erhalt.
2. Bitte lesen Sie den Studenten die folgenden Instruktionen vor:
Dieser Test ist Teil einer Diplomarbeit in Luft- und Raumfahrttechnik.
Der Test vor Ihnen wird Studenten in mehreren Landern weltweit gegeben.
Vielen Dank fur Ihre Teilnahme und Kooperation.
Ihre Antworten zu diesem Test sind anonym. Schreiben Sie daher nicht
lhren Namen auf die Fragebogen.
Sie haben 15 Minuten, um den Test zu beantworten, was mehr als genug
Zeit sein sollte.
Nach 10 Minuten werde ich Sie darauf hinweisen, daB
funf Minuten verbleiben, um den Test zu vervoil standigen.
Bitte lesen Sie alle Fragen aufmerksam, und antworten Sie so, daB Sie
und Ihre Meinungen am besten wiedergegeben sind. Bitte geben Sie
professionelle
Antworten, um diese Studie zu einem Erfolg zu machen.
Bitte antworten Sie in Deutsch. Vielen Dank, beginnen Sie jetzt.
3. Starten Sie die Zeit.
4. Bitte lesen Sie die folgenden Satze, nachdem 10 Minuten um sind:
10 Minuten sind um, 5 Minuten verbleiben, um den Test zu beenden.
Bitte versuchen Sie, alle Fragen zu beantworten. Bitte stellen Sie
sicher, daB Sie Frage 6 beantworten.
5. 15 Minuten nach Beginn, verlesen Sie bitte das Folgende:
15 Minuten sind um, bitte beenden Sie den Test. Schlagen Sie die letzte
Seite des Tests auf, und uberprufen Sie, ob Sie Frage 6 beantwortet haben.
Uenn Sie Frage 6 noch nicht beantwortet haben, tun Sie das bitte
jetzt.
6. Bitte sammeln Sie alle Fragebogen ein.
Tun Sie die Tests in den beigelegten Ruckumschlag und schlieBen Sie ihn.
7. Senden Sie den Test an die folgende Adresse (wie auf dem Ruckumschlag):
Dr. John Wise / Florian Jentsch
Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research (CAAR)
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida 32114
U.S.A.
Bitte benutzen Sie Luftpost und schreiben Sie "Dokumente" in die
Zollerklarung.
Nochmals, vielen Dank fur Ihre Hilfe.
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APPENDIX J
TEST RESULTS FOR THE 13 PICTOGRAMS
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TABLE OF

EXITl

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

3

14

1

3

21

0.0000

12

16

35

24

87

1.0000

12

7

13

10

42

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL
TABLE OF

EXITl

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

COLUMN PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

11.11

37.84

2.04

.11

14.00

21.00

0.0000

44.44

43.24

71.43

64..86

58.00

87.00

1.0000

44.44

18.92

26.53

27,.03

28.00

42.00

TOTAL
N

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00

100.00
150

TABLE OF

SLIDEl

37

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

0

0

3

3

6

0.0000

1

2

12

4

19

1.0000

26

35

34

30

125

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL

SLIDEl

TABLE OF
COLUMN

(COLUMNS)

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

PERCENTS

BRITISH

FRENCH

GERMAN

US

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

.00

.00

6.12

8.11

4.00

6.00

0.0000

3.70

5.41

24.49

10.81

12.67

19.00

1.0000

96.30

94.59

69.39

81.08

83.33

125.00

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TOTAL
M
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HEELSl

TABLE OF

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

0

1

4

1

6

0.0000

3

10

6

3

22

1.0000

24

26

39

33

122

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL

HEELSl

TABLE OF
COLUMN

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

.00

2.70

8.16

2.70

4.00

6.00

0.0000

11.11

27.03

12.24

8.11

14.67

22.00

1.0000

88.89

70.27

79.59

89.19

81.33

122.00

TOTAL
N

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TABLE OF

OXYGEN

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENC][ES
BRITISH

US

GERMAN

FRENCH

TOTAL

-1.0000

1

1

2

2

6

0.0000

1

1

1

1

4

1.0000

25

35

46

34

140

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL
TABLE OF
COLUMN

OXYGEN

(COLUMNS)

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

GERMAN

US

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

3.70

2.70

4.08

5.41

4.00

6.00

0.0000

3.70

2.70

2.04

2.70

2.67

4.00

1.0000

92.59

94.59

93.88

91.89

93.33

140.00

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TOTAL
N
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TABLE OF ELECTROl

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

0

0

1

1

2

0.0000

17

12

15

28

72

1.0000

10

25

33

8

76

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL

TABLE OF ELECTROl
COLUMN

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

.00

.00

2.04

2.70

1.33

2.00

0.0000

62.96

32.43

30.61

75.68

48.00

72.00

1.0000

37.04

67.57

67.35

21.62

50.67

76.00

TOTAL
N

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TABLE OF

HEELS2

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

5

1

1

2

9

0.0000

6

8

11

7

32

1.0000

16

28

37

28

109

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL
TABLE OF
COLUMN

HEELS2

(COLUMNS)

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

GERMAN

US

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

18.52

2.70

2.04

5.41

6.00

9.00

0.0000

22.22

21.62

22.45

18.92

21.33

32.00

1.0000

59.26

75.68

75.51

75.68

72.67

109.00

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TOTAL
N
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TABLE OF SMOKELIG

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

0

6

10

3

19

0.0000

13

18

15

26

72

1.0000

14

13

24

8

59

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL

TABLE OF SMOKELIG
COLUMN

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

.00

16.22

20.41

8.11

12.67

19.00

0.0000

48.15

48.65

30.61

70.27

48.00

72.00

1.0000

51.85

35.14

48.98

21.62

39.33

59.00

TOTAL
N

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TABLE OF

SLIDE2

(COLUMNS)

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

US

GERMAN

FRENCH

TOTAL

-1.0000

0

3

2

4

9

0.0000

2

8

8

4

22

1.0000

25

26

39

29

119

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL
TABLE OF
COLUMN

SLIDE2

(COLUMNS)

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

GERMAN

US

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

.00

8.11

4.08

10.81

6.00

9.00

0.0000

7.41

21.62

16.33

10.81

14.67

22.00

1.0000

92.59

70.27

79.59

78.38

79.33

119.00

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TOTAL
N

TABLE OF

DITCH

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

9

19

19

22

69

0.0000

14

14

23

11

62

1.0000

4

4

7

4

19

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL
TABLE OF
COLUMN

DITCH

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

33.33

51.35

38.78

59.46

46.00

69.00

0.0000

51.85

37.84

46.94

29.73

41.33

62.00

1.0000

14.81

10.81

14.29

10.81

12.67

19.00

TOTAL
N

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TABLE OF

HEELS3

(COLUMNS)

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

7

6

5

10

28

0.0000

12

20

20

19

71

1.0000

8

11

24

8

51

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL
TABLE OF
COLUMN

HEELS3

(COLUMNS)

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

GERMAN

US

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

25.93

16.22

10.20

27.03

18.67

28.00

0.0000

44.44

54.05

40.82

51.35

47.33

71.00

1.0000

29.63

29.73

48.98

21.62

34.00

51.00

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TOTAL
N

TABLE OF FLOORLIG

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

-1.0000

3

8

4

2

17

0.0000

3

9

12

10

34

1.0000

21

20

33

25

99

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL

TABLE OF FLOORLIG
COLUMN

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

US

GERMAN

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

11.11

21.62

8.16

5.41

11.33

17.00

0.0000

11.11

24.32

24.49

27.03

22.67

34.00

1.0000

77.78

54.05

67.35

67.57

66.00

99.00

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TOTAL
N

TABLE OF ELECTR02

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENCIES
BRITISH

US

GERMAN

FRENCH

TOTAL

-1.0000

0

0

2

0

2

0.0000

20

29

27

35

111

1.0000

7

8

20

2

37

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL

TABLE OF ELECTR02
COLUMN

(COLUMNS)

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

GERMAN

US

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

.00

.00

4.08

.00

1.33

2.00

0.0000

74.07

78.38

55.10

94.59

74.00

111.00

1.0000

25.93

21.62

40.82

5.41

24.67

37.00

100.00
27

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TOTAL
N
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TABLE OF

BUTANE

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

FREQUENC][ES
BRITISH

US

GERMAN

FRENCH

TOTAL

-1.0000

0

1

0

0

1

0.0000

24

36

44

34

138

1.0000

3

0

5

3

11

27

37

49

37

150

TOTAL
TABLE OF
COLUMN

BUTANE

(ROWS) BY LANGUAGES

(COLUMNS)

PERCENTS
BRITISH

FRENCH

GERMAN

US

TOTAL

N

-1.0000

.00

2.70

.00

.00

.67

1.00

0.0000

88.89

97.30

89.80

91.89

92.00

138.00

1.0000

11.11

.00

10.20

8.11

7.33

11.00

100.00
37

100.00
49

100.00
37

100.00
150

TOTAL
N

100.00
27

